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Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law
KATHRYN E. KOVACS*
This Article employs William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s theory of
superstatutes as a tool to argue that administrative common law that contradicts or
ignores the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is illegitimate. Eskridge and
Ferejohn conceive of statutes that emerge from a lengthy, public debate and take on
great normative weight over time as “superstatutes.” Superstatute theory highlights
the deficiency in deliberation about the meaning of the APA. The APA bears all the
hallmarks of a superstatute. Unlike the typical federal superstatute, however, the
APA is not administered by a single agency. Thus, to respect and encourage the
civic-republican style of deliberation that Eskridge and Ferejohn espouse, courts
must adhere more closely to the compromises encoded in the statute’s text, paying
particular attention to the context and history of each individual provision. Courts
should hesitate before moving too far towards the boundaries of the text’s possible
meaning. Venturing beyond those boundaries altogether is even more troubling. In
the absence of an agency that spurs public deliberation about the meaning of the
APA, administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the APA should be
presumed to be illegitimate.
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INTRODUCTION
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA or the “Act”)1 is one of the most
important statutes in the United States Code. The Constitution assumes that
administrative agencies will assist the President in fulfilling his executive duties, but
it says nothing about agencies’ structures and functions or about their relationships
with the other branches of government.2 After the explosion in the number of federal
agencies in the early twentieth century,3 Congress stepped into the breach, setting forth
basic principles of agency procedure and judicial review in the APA. The APA has
taken on quasi-constitutional status.4 Although agency-specific statutes now abound,
the APA is still the “fundamental charter” of the “Fourth Branch” of the government.5
Administrative common law is at the heart of one of the oldest debates about the
APA. Congress worked for years to pass the Act.6 It represented a monumental
compromise between conservatives and liberals, and neither side was fully satisfied.
Following its enactment, both sides set out to convince the courts that their view of
the new law was the right view. Conservatives sold the law as imposing important
new restrictions on agencies, while liberals viewed the law as simply restating preexisting common law.7 By and large, the liberals won. Traditionally, the APA is
viewed as leaving ample room for the courts to continue to apply and develop
administrative common law, or at least to read the Act’s terms loosely.8 That
interpretation of the APA, however, does not respect the enormous effort that went

1. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012)).
2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1002, 1010 (2007); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional
Horticulture: Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1281–82
(2009) [hereinafter Eskridge and Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture]; Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 573, 576–77 (1984).
3. In the first thirty years of the twentieth century, the number of federal administrative
agencies doubled. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1996).
4. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1077 (2004);
William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1017, 1033 (2006); Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s
Adjudication Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
1003, 1004 (2004); Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the
Gilded Age, 119 YALE L. J. 1362, 1365 (2010); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1997).
5. Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 856, 874 (2007).
6. Shepherd, supra note 3.
7. Id. at 1662–66.
8. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.17, 2.18, 6.37, 7.19,
14.10 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE] (asserting that the
courts do and should continue to develop administrative common law); LOUIS L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 327–29, 336–37, 372 (1965) (asserting that
the APA has had little effect on the common law of judicial review).
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into constructing this unique enactment, much less the significant attention Congress
has paid to the APA since its enactment. Nor does it pay heed to the need for open,
public deliberation in a functioning democracy.
In this Article, I view the APA through the lens of an important new theory of
statutory interpretation: William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s theory of
superstatutes.9 Superstatute theory highlights the deficiency in deliberation about the
meaning of the APA. That deliberation deficiency makes it problematic for courts to
interpret the APA’s terms loosely, much less create law that exceeds those terms
altogether and contravenes Congress’s intent. Any interpretation of the APA should
focus on the language of each individual provision, as well as its context and history,
both before and after enactment. In the very least, courts should not ignore the APA.
Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn employ the term “superstatute” to refer to
statutes that have become “entrenched” in America’s statutory constitution.10 They
are enacted “after lengthy normative debate” and “prove robust as a solution, a
standard, or a norm over time.”11 Although Eskridge and Ferejohn did not identify
the APA as a superstatute, the Act exemplifies this idea: it resulted from years of
legislative activity and has become deeply entrenched.
There is a general consensus that the APA is not a typical statute. Then-Professor
Scalia observed in 1978 that “the Supreme Court regarded the APA as a sort of
superstatute, or subconstitution, in the field of administrative process: a basic
framework that was not lightly to be supplanted or embellished.”12 Other

9. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC];
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2000) [hereinafter
Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory
“constitution,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Eskridge, America’s Statutory
“constitution”]. Eskridge and Ferejohn’s work has contributed significantly to the development
of legal theory. See, e.g., Paul Frymer, Statutes, Courts, and Democracy in America, 47 TULSA
L. REV. 229, 234 (2011) (book review) (“vast, ambitious, intellectually provocative, and
declarative”); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Growing a Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 647, 654
(2011) (book review) (“inspiring”); Robert A. Katzmann, Introduction to The Yale Law Journal
Online Symposium on Eskridge and Ferejohn’s A Republic of Statutes: The New American
Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 293, 293 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum
/introduction-to-the-yale-law-journal-online-symposium-on-eskridge-and-ferejohns-a-republic
-of-statutes-the-new-american-constitution (“landmark collaboration”); Mathew D. McCubbins
& Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and Normative Interrogatory,
120 YALE L. J. ONLINE 387, 406 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/superstaturoty
-entenchment-a-positive-and-normative-interrogatory (“an admirable—indeed historic—effort
at big-picture legal theory”); Edward L. Rubin, How Statutes Interpret the Constitution, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 297, 298 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-statutes-interpret
-the-constitution (“a major contribution”); Glen Staszewski, Constitutional Dialogue in a
Republic of Statutes, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837, 862 (“important”).
10. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 111.
11. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216. Eskridge and Ferejohn
abandoned the hyphen in “super-statutes” in their recent book. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN,
REPUBLIC, supra note 9.
12. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 363.
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commentators agree that the APA has taken on quasi-constitutional status.13 Some
have even dubbed the APA a superstatute under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory.14
None, however, has taken on the task of demonstrating why the APA is a
superstatute; nor have scholars explored the implications of that status.
Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that superstatutes are and should be interpreted
dynamically and evolutively to grow and change over time.15 Hence, one might
assume that dubbing the APA a superstatute would lend support to the scholars who
applaud the courts’ continued development of administrative common law.16
Applying superstatute theory to the APA, however, yields a surprising result because
the APA differs from most other federal superstatutes in one important respect: no
single agency is charged with its implementation. Single-agency implementation is
not a requirement for superstatute status,17 but it is central to the assertion that
superstatutes should be interpreted broadly and evolutively. That assertion is built on
a civic-republican model of deliberation that necessitates public involvement in legal
change. In the absence of direct public engagement through an election, Eskridge
and Ferejohn’s model of deliberation puts a single agency at the center of an
interpretive web, with the other branches of government and the public intertwined.
Unlike most other superstatutes, however, agencies are not the primary interpreters
of the APA—courts are. And courts are not deliberative in the civic-republican sense
that superstatute theory demands to legitimize evolutive interpretation.18

13. See supra note 4.
14. E.g., Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5, 18
(2009); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in
Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2054 (2011); Frymer, supra note 9, at
234; David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 675–76 (2005); John
C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1816 n.151 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 466
(2015); see also Lawrence Solum, Gluck on Entrenched Canons of Statutory Interpretation,
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (April 1, 2013, 12:15 p.m.), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory
/2013/04/gluck-on-entrenched-canons-of-statutory-interpretation.html.
15. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 291, 293; Eskridge & Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1247, 1249.
16. E.g., DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 8, at §§ 2.17, 2.18, 6.37,
7.19, 14.10; Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee
Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3 [hereinafter Davis, Administrative Common Law]; JAFFE,
supra note 8, at 327–29, 336–37, 372, 376; Gillian E. Metzger, Annual Review of
Administrative Law—Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1293 (2012); Scalia, supra note 12, at 382, 385–87; see also Emily S. Bremer, The
Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215, 1246 (2014) (stating that the
scholarly literature “increasingly embraces the validity of administrative common law”). But see
John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 115 (1998).
17. Eskridge and Ferejohn include “executive-legislative partnerships,” state statutes that
reflect a consensus among states, and international agreements within the ambit of
“superstatutes.” ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 7, 16, 212–13.
18. In asserting the normative superiority of deliberation that involves not just the parties
to a particular court proceeding but the public and representative branches of government,
Eskridge and Ferejohn join a long line of theorists, including Jeremy Waldron, Amy Gutmann,
Dennis Thompson, and Mark Seidenfeld. See infra Part IV.A.
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Eskridge and Ferejohn did not address superstatutes like the APA that are
entrenched and quasi-constitutional but do not undergo the sort of civic-republican
deliberation their theory requires to justify evolutive interpretation. I apply
superstatute theory to this new category to discern how the APA should be
interpreted.19 Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that judicial review of superstatutes should
respect and encourage public deliberation. In the APA’s case, that means the courts
should adhere more closely to the compromises encoded in the statute’s text and
hesitate before moving too far towards the boundaries of the text’s possible meaning.
Given the extraordinary legislative process that led to the APA’s enactment and the
relative paucity of agency-based deliberative feedback since then, courts should be
particularly chary of interpreting the APA’s text in a way that shifts the balance
Congress reached through the political process. Courts should look more closely at
the context and history of the APA’s individual provisions, including Congress’s
treatment of each provision in the original legislative process and the quality of
deliberation the provision has seen since enactment.
If moving too far towards the boundaries of the APA’s text is problematic, then
venturing beyond those boundaries altogether is even more troubling. The line
between broad, evolutive interpretation of the APA and administrative common law
is blurry, but there are many doctrines of administrative law that cross the line.20 My
concern here is with those doctrines of administrative common law that contravene
or simply ignore the APA, such as doctrines that give superdeference to certain
agencies despite Congress’s deliberate decision to subject all agencies to the same
standard of review; procedural requirements that exceed the APA’s minimal
rulemaking provisions; and prudential ripeness doctrine, which conflicts with the
APA’s promise of judicial review to any person who suffers a legal wrong and
challenges final agency action.21 Scholars have long defended the courts’ journeys
into the realm of administrative common law.22 Applying superstatute theory to the
APA highlights a weakness in their defense. In the absence of deliberation that
involves the public, administrative common law that ignores or contravenes the APA
must be presumed to be illegitimate.23
In Part I, I provide a brief introduction to administrative common law, and in Part
II, I do the same for superstatute theory. In Part III, I demonstrate that the APA is a
superstatute. Finally, in Part IV, I show that, although it is entrenched, the APA does
not undergo the civic-republican style of deliberation that superstatute theory
requires to justify evolutive interpretation. Although Eskridge and Ferejohn did not
address this category of superstatutes, their theory nonetheless provides insight about

19. Whether any other superstatutes fall into this category is a subject for future inquiry.
20. See infra Part I.
21. Id.
22. See supra note 16.
23. Superstatutes theory has its critics. E.g., Frymer, supra note 9, at 234–37; McCubbins
& Rodriguez, supra note 9; Adrian Vermeule, Superstatutes, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/superstatutes (reviewing ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN,
REPUBLIC, supra note 9). That criticism does not undercut my reliance on the theory since I
use it merely as a launchpad for discussion. Moreover, critics of superstatute theory are
perhaps more likely to be critics of dynamic interpretation and administrative common law
and thus reach the same destination as I do by a different route.
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how the APA should be interpreted and leads to the conclusion that administrative
common law that contradicts Congress’s intent faces significant legitimacy
problems.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE COMMON LAW
Despite the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
that “[t]here is no federal general common law,”24 federal common law persists. The
Supreme Court has held that federal common law is permissible in a “few and
restricted” areas “in which a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely
federal interests, and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to
develop substantive law.”25 Recognizing Congress’s “superior authority” in policy
making and the judiciary’s “place in the constitutional scheme,”26 however, federal
courts exercise caution in developing common law, even where its creation is
authorized, such as in admiralty law.27
Any attempt to discern where statutory interpretation ends and common law
begins is challenging, since the two exist on a continuum.28 Like Gillian Metzger, I
conceive of common law as judicial pronouncements that “venture too far afield from
statutory text or discernible legislative purpose to count simply as statutory
interpretation.”29 A text may be subject to many interpretations, depending on the
interpreter’s approach. Common law exceeds the boundaries of any permissible
interpretation.30 Thus, as John Duffy observed, “[T]he split between statutory and

24. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as
Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 512 (2010) (“[T]he Erie principle has not
governed in anything near such absolute form . . . .”). As Abbe Gluck points out, “The Erie rule
itself is a federal common law doctrine.” Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory
Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 798, 811 (2013).
25. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). How much room Erie leaves for federal common law is a
matter of debate. See Gluck, supra note 24, at 809.
26. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 32 (1990).
27. See Thomas Field, Craig Allen Nard & John Duffy, Dickinson v. Zurko: An Amicus
Brief, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 49, 71 (2000).
28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 367 (5th ed. 2007); Davis,
Administrative Common Law, supra note 16, at 4; Metzger, supra note 16, at 1310–11.
29. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1295; see also Davis, Administrative Common Law, supra
note 16, at 3 (“Common law is law that courts have created without interpreting a
constitutional or statutory provision.”); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (defining “federal common law” as “any federal
rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text—whether
or not that rule can be described as the product of ‘interpretation’ in either a conventional or
unconventional sense” (emphasis in original)). Others have used the term “administrative
common law” to refer to “agency-developed interpretations of law.” Richard W. Murphy,
Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 920 n.16 (2006).
30. See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that common law reflects “a degree of creativity beyond
that expected of a court engaged in the construction and application of an authoritative text”);
Duffy, supra note 16, at 115 (“Under the common-law method, a court decides a case without
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common-law approaches in administrative law” is not a “disagreement[] about how
to interpret the APA, but whether to interpret the APA.”31
Administrative law is infused with common law.32 Some provisions of the APA
carve out space for common law, like the savings clause that permits the courts to
continue to employ equitable doctrines in fashioning remedies.33 But the Act does
not delegate broad authority to the courts to develop administrative common law.
Section 559 of the APA provides that the Act does not “limit or repeal additional
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.”34 The Supreme
Court held in Dickinson v. Zurko that section 559 did not preserve the courts’ ability
to continue to fashion administrative common law, but merely “grandfathered
common-law variations” that were clearly established when the APA was enacted.35
Some provisions of the APA leave room for, and indeed are so indefinite as to
invite, judicial elaboration. The terms “arbitrary” and “capricious” in section 706’s
standard of review, for example, might provide a springboard for requiring agencies
to evaluate “relevant data” and disregard factors that Congress did not intend for the
agency to consider.36 Other provisions are more definite. Section 704 requires
exhaustion of administrative remedies “only when expressly required by statute or
when an agency rule requires appeal before review and the administrative action is
made inoperative pending that review.”37
My concern is with common law that contradicts or ignores the APA.38 Several
examples will help to frame my argument. I have previously demonstrated that in the

guidance from any textual codification of law and policy.”).
31. Duffy, supra note 16, at 181 (emphasis in original).
32. Davis, Administrative Common Law, supra note 16, at 3; Duffy, supra note 16, at
117; Metzger, supra note 16, at 1311; Metzger, supra note 24, at 508; Symposium, Present at
the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 526 (1986) (Kenneth
Culp Davis observing that the bulk of administrative law is common law). Professor Duffy
explains some of the reasons for administrative common law’s staying power. Duffy, supra
note 16, at 119, 130–38.
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“Nothing herein . . . affects . . . the power or duty of the
court to . . . deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground . . . .”); see also
Duffy, supra note 16, at 128; Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
35. 527 U.S. 150, 155, 161 (1999). Even the dissenting justices agreed with that
interpretation of § 559. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 882 (“Hard-look
review may or may not be a correct or even plausible interpretation of § 706(2)(A).”); Metzger,
supra note 24, at 491 (“Over the years . . . the courts came to read arbitrary and capricious in
an increasingly rigorous fashion until it came to embody today’s hard look review.”); cf.
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1118–21,
1134 (2009) (arguing that judicial review under the arbitrary or capricious standard can be
adjusted to respond to emergency circumstances).
37. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993) (emphasis in original) (discussing 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1992)).
38. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583,
600–03 (2011) [hereinafter Kovacs, Leveling]; see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut,
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APA, Congress deliberately subjected all agencies to the same standard of review—
the deferential arbitrary or capricious standard—and declined the War Department’s
request that the military be exempted from the bill altogether.39 Yet the courts give
the military more deference than other agencies.40 Broad application of a commonlaw superdeference standard to the military is unjustified, because the APA’s
exception for “military authority exercised in the field in time of war” insulates core
military functions from judicial review.41 That exception obviates
separation-of-powers concerns with judicial review of military action, leaving only
a common law rule that contradicts Congress’s considered judgment.42
John Duffy showed that “ripeness doctrine has no place in the APA.”43 The APA
provides that if a person is “suffering legal wrong” or is “adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action” and is challenging “final agency action for which there
is no adequate remedy in a court,” that person is entitled to judicial review.44
Prudential ripeness doctrine, in contrast, balances “the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.”45 Although the Court recognized that the APA cabins exhaustion
doctrine,46 it continues to apply common law ripeness doctrine even though, as
Professor Duffy pointed out, “[T]he APA does not authorize balancing.”47

131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (explaining that the need for federal common law disappears
when Congress enacts a statute addressing the question directly).
39. Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38; Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military
Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 697, 700–01
(2010) [hereinafter Kovacs, A History]. I employ the arbitrary or capricious standard as a
catchall for the various standards set forth in § 706(2), as others have before me. See Indep.
Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1248 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677,
683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Beermann, supra note 30, at 24 (“The catchall standard that governs
judicial review of agency action, which applies to most cases not involving formal agency
adjudication, is the arbitrary and capricious test . . . .”); Emily Hammond Meazell, Super
Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109
MICH. L. REV. 733, 740 (2011) (“[S]ubsection (A) serves as a catch-all standard that generally
applies . . . to review of informal adjudication and rulemaking.”); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial
Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32
TULSA L.J. 221, 232 n.70, 233 (1996).
40. Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 591–99.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(g) (2012).
42. Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 616–23. But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1001–03 (2013)
[hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (empirical study showing that congressional drafters
may intend to delegate different levels of interpretive authority to different agencies); Lisa
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725,
753–54 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II] (discussing those results).
43. Duffy, supra note 16, at 162.
44. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012).
45. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
46. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993).
47. Duffy, supra note 16, at 177; see also Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior,
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Nicholas Bagley recently demonstrated that the presumption in favor of judicial
review of agency action is common law.48 The Supreme Court grounded that
presumption in the APA’s provisions authorizing any person “suffering legal wrong
. . . or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action” to challenge “final agency
action” in court.49 As Bagley pointed out, however, the APA only provides for
judicial review “except to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review.”50
Thus, the APA does not establish a presumption; it “establishes a default rule
favoring judicial review where no statute precludes it.”51
Many scholars believe that Chevron doctrine52 is common law.53 The APA
instructs that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law.”54 Yet,
the Court in Chevron held that, if the relevant statute is silent or ambiguous on a
question before the court, the court should defer to the administering agency’s
interpretation of the statute.55 In Chevron itself, the Court made no effort to reconcile
its holding with the APA. Recently, the Court equated this part (step two) of the
Chevron test with review under the APA’s arbitrary or capricious standard,56 but it
has yet to explain how that meshes with the instruction that courts decide questions
of law. Justice Scalia may have come closest in his dissent in United States v. Mead
Corp., where he suggested that, if a statute is ambiguous, the only remaining question
of law is “whether the agency’s interpretation had gone beyond the scope of
discretion that the statutory ambiguity conferred.”57 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts,
in his dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC, opined that, in applying Chevron, the Court
gives “binding deference to permissible agency interpretations of statutory
ambiguities because Congress has delegated to the agency the authority to interpret
those ambiguities ‘with the force of law.’ . . . Whether Congress has conferred such

538 U.S. 803 (2003); Beermann, supra note 30, at 20 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001)). The Supreme Court recently expressed some discomfort
with prudential ripeness doctrine. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334,
2347 (2014). The Court’s discomfort, however, seems limited to evaluating ripeness as a
question of jurisdiction. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the
Court did not abandon the zone-of-interest test for prudential standing entirely, but merely shifted
the analysis from jurisdiction to the merits. 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–90 (2014). The Court’s citation
of Lexmark in Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2347, indicates that the Court may be
contemplating shifting the ripeness analysis to the merits but not abandoning it altogether.
48. Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1320–21 (2014).
49. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1964)).
50. Bagley, supra note 48, at 1304 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012) (emphasis omitted)).
51. Id. at 1305.
52. Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
53. E.g., Beermann, supra note 30, at 21; Duffy, supra note 16, at 118, 189–99; Metzger,
supra note 16, at 1300–01; see also Gluck, supra note 24, at 798, 801 (agreeing that Chevron
is common law and arguing that other statutory interpretation tools are common law as well);
Metzger, supra note 24, at 505–06 (characterizing Chevron as a “constitutionally inspired
requirement[]” whose “constitutional underpinnings remain[] unspecified”).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
55. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45.
56. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011).
57. 533 U.S. 218, 241 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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power is the ‘relevant question[ ] of law’ that must be answered before affording
Chevron deference.”58 But obviously those dissents do not speak for the Court.
The Supreme Court explained in Vermont Yankee that the APA’s rulemaking
provisions are basic, reflecting Congress’s intent to leave much of rulemaking
procedure to agency discretion.59 Thus, when courts impose procedural requirements
on rulemaking that exceed the APA’s minimal constraints, they may contravene
congressional intent. For example, in Vermont Yankee, the Court held that the D.C.
Circuit erred in requiring trial-type procedures in an informal rulemaking.60 Extant
examples include the requirements that a final rule be a “logical outgrowth”61 of the
proposed rule and that agencies provide public notice of the information they
considered in formulating the rule,62 as well as the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that
ex parte contacts in informal rulemakings be disclosed (to the extent that requirement

58. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Perhaps Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts read Peter Strauss’s article contending that
Chevron merely expanded NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944): “In its first
step, as in Hearst, a court will independently decide what authority has been conferred on an
agency.” Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—the Courts in Administrative Law,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 818 (2008). Thus, “[t]he court’s independent conclusion of law might
be that authority over some particular question of meaning . . . has been validly assigned to an
administrative agency.” Id. John Duffy suggested that if Chevron deference were contingent
on explicit statutory delegations of rulemaking authority, it could be reconciled with the text
of the APA. Duffy, supra note 16, at 199–207. By that reasoning, Mead may have moved
Chevron over the line from common law to statutory interpretation. See Thomas W. Merrill
& Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 868–72 (2001) (arguing that
Chevron doctrine is not common law but instead rests on congressional delegations of
administrative authority). But see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 273, 279–88 (2011); Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 32 VA. TAX REV. 813 (2013). Interestingly, in their empirical study of
congressional drafting, Gluck and Bressman found that Mead is more reflective of Congress’s
actual practices than any other canon “except perhaps Chevron.” Gluck & Bressman, Part I,
supra note 42, at 994; see also id. at 999.
59. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524, 545–46 (1978)
(discussing legislative history).
60. Id. at 523–24.
61. See Beermann, supra note 30, at 8.
62. Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 245–46 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Portland Cement doctrine
cannot be squared with the text of § 553 of the APA.”); Beermann, supra note 30, at 8;
Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 892–99; see also Metzger, supra note 24, at 509
(“[C]urrent requirements of notice and agency response to comments far exceed[] what the
text of the APA suggests was originally expected.”); Scalia, supra note 12, at 380–81 & n.154.
But see Jack M. Beermann, Rethinking Notice 2 (Boston U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
13-49, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349716
(“[T]here is a good instrumental case to be made against strict adherence to the text of the
APA and in favor of requiring a new round of notice and comment when agencies make
unanticipated changes to their proposals when promulgating final rules.”); Peter L. Strauss,
Statutes That Are Not Static—The Case of the APA, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 767, 796–
98 (2005) (arguing that the Freedom of Information Act reshaped the meaning of the notice
provisions in § 553).
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survives)63 and its demand for open-mindedness in rulemaking.64 As this Article goes
to press, the Supreme Court is poised to decide whether the D.C. Circuit erred in
requiring the Department of Labor to go through notice and comment procedures
before changing an interpretive rule even though the APA expressly exempts
interpretive rules from the notice and comment provisions.65 While these common
law requirements do not attempt to judicialize rulemaking to the extent that the D.C.
Circuit did in Vermont Yankee, they nonetheless exceed section 553’s minimal
provisions and may contradict Congress’s intent “that the discretion of the agencies
and not that of the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices
should be employed.”66
Perhaps administrative common law has survived because, as we get further away
from 1946, the monumental legislative effort that went into enacting the APA almost
seventy years ago becomes less salient to modern judges than concerns about
procedural fairness in a growing administrative state.67 Regardless of the reason for
its longevity, the courts are not open about their development of administrative
common law, and they have not explained why it is permissible in some
circumstances but not others, much less grappled with the constitutional concerns
administrative common law raises.68
While scholars have long endorsed administrative common law,69 Gillian Metzger
provides its strongest defense. She argues that, because administrative common law
is important, inevitable, and legitimate, the courts should acknowledge its existence
and be more transparent about its employment.70 Even Metzger’s defense, however,
cannot save administrative common law from the deliberative deficiency that
superstatute theory reveals, as explained in Part IV. To set up that argument, I first
describe superstatute theory, apply it to the APA, and explore the interpretive
consequences of that exercise.

63. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 885 (recognizing that the D.C. Circuit has
narrowed, but “never expressly disavowed the doctrine”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1788 (2007) (“[T]he
D.C. Circuit has vacillated as to whether a ban on ex parte communications in informal
proceedings is consistent with Overton Park or at odds with Vermont Yankee.”).
64. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 889.
65. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 2820 (2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 14,
at 432 (“[T]he Paralyzed Veterans rule is best seen as a form of federal common law . . . .”).
66. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978).
67. Beermann, supra note 30, at 27.
68. Id. at 2, 5, 29; Davis, Administrative Common Law, supra note 16, at 5–6; see also
Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 600–02, 604.
69. See supra note 16. “Leading administrative law theorists in the post-New Deal period,
like Professors Louis Jaffe and Kenneth Culp Davis, openly celebrated administrative law’s
common law character.” Metzger, supra note 16, at 1317. Jaffe and Davis’s endorsement of
administrative common law “is understandable, for the decades in which they worked . . .
marked the era of the ‘New Federal Common Law,’ so named by Judge Friendly’s famous
1964 article.” Duffy, supra note 16, at 136.
70. Metzger, supra note 16.
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II. ESKRIDGE AND FEREJOHN’S THEORY OF SUPERSTATUTES
A. Identifying Superstatutes
Others used the term “superstatute” before Eskridge and Ferejohn,71 but they
are the only ones to have developed a theory of constitutional change centered on
superstatutes.72 Eskridge and Ferejohn start from the premise that “[n]ot all statutes
are created equal” and employ the term superstatute to represent those statutes that
“successfully penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a deep way.”73
Because they result from a public, deliberative process and survive efforts to dilute
their central ideas, superstatutes take on a “normative gravity” that ordinary
statutes do not attain.74 Status as a superstatute affects how the superstatute itself
is and ought to be interpreted. These “quasi-constitutional” enactments also
provide a “normative backdrop, influencing the way other statutes are read and
applied,”75 and because superstatutes reflect deep deliberation and broad public
support, they should also influence the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution.76
Eskridge and Ferejohn identify many federal superstatutes: the statute creating
the Bank of the United States;77 the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, including the

71. E.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 91 (1991); Eugene
Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO
ST. L.J. 65, 111 (1996); Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 2121, 2141 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment,
11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 142 (1994); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 770 n.266 (1988); Max Radin, The Myth
of Magna Carta, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1075 (1947).
72. Ackerman distinguished his thesis from Eskridge and Ferejohn’s superstatute theory:
“I am concerned with landmark statutes that deserve full admission into the constitutional
canon, while they deal with a broader class of super-statutes that deserve quasi-constitutional
status of a lesser, but still very significant, kind.” Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution,
120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1753 n.38 (2007) (emphasis in original). Superstatute theory has a
broader conception of legal change than Ackerman advances insofar as superstatutes “acquire
their normative force through a series of public confrontations and debates over time and not
through a single stylized dramatic confrontation.” Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra
note 9, at 1270; see also id. at 1271.
73. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1215; see also Eskridge,
America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 6; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes,
supra note 9.
74. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216; see also ESKRIDGE
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27.
75. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1265–66; see also ESKRIDGE
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 59.
76. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 39–40; see also
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 6, 27, 102, 437–44.
77. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes,
supra note 9, at 1223–25.
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Rules Decision Act;78 the Civil Rights Acts of 186679 and 1871;80 the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890;81 the Federal Arbitration Act of 1926;82 the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932;83 many New Deal statutes, including the Securities
Act of 1933,84 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,85 the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935,86 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938;87 the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938;88 the Civil Rights Act of 1964;89 the Voting Rights Act of
1965;90 the Clean Air Act of 197091 and Clean Water Act of 1972;92 the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978;93 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,94
among others. They also include “state statutory convergences,” like the married

78. The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1223 n.22.
79. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982
(2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1225–26.
80. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)); see
also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1225–26.
81. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012));
see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1231–32; ESKRIDGE
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 121.
82. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1260–61.
83. The Norris-La Guardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115
(2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227.
84. The Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77bbbb (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227.
85. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227.
86. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227.
87. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1227.
88. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1257.
89. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn,
Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1237; ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 88.
90. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C. (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra
note 9, at 88, 117.
91. The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 301.
92. The Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at
13 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 301.
93. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); see also Eskridge, America’s Statutory
“constitution,” supra note 9, at 36.
94. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012)); see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 58–59.
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women’s property laws and no-fault divorce,95 as well as international agreements,
like the Geneva Conventions.96
Under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory, superstatutes typically exhibit several
characteristics. First, superstatutes “alter substantially the then-existing regulatory
baselines with a new principle or policy.”97 They “seek[] to establish a new
normative or institutional framework.”98 Second, a superstatute’s new principle
“‘sticks’ in the public culture in a deep way, becoming foundational or axiomatic to
our thinking.”99 It “prove[s] robust . . . over time.”100 Third, a superstatute has a
“broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the
statute.”101 A superstatute “will have colonizing effects on other statutes” and may
have “a gravitational pull on constitutional law itself.”102
Procedurally, a superstatute “emerges after a lengthy period of public discussion
and official deliberation” and “passes the test of time.”103 In A Republic of Statutes,
Eskridge and Ferejohn present a series of case studies of statutes that became
entrenched superstatutes. Typically, the story begins with Congress’s statutory
response to a broad “social movement.”104 Then the statute’s supporters and
administrators implement the statute in a practical way that makes progress toward
the statute’s goal and “avoid[s] the disasters predicted by opponents.”105 If the statute
becomes “sufficiently valuable” to a growing segment of society, the statute will be
consolidated when a new Congress reaffirms, and perhaps even expands, the original
statute.106 Thus, the superstatute’s new principle is “debated, honed, and
strengthened through an ongoing give-and-take among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches.”107 Through this public, deliberative process, the statute “wins

95. Id. at 16, 224, 244.
96. Id. at 16, 419.
97. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1230; see also ESKRIDGE
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 26; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note
9, at 1219.
98. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216.
99. Id. at 1231; see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 26; Eskridge
& Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216, 1230, 1273.
100. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1216.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1235–36; see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 214–16;
Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1240–42.
103. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1231, 1273; see also ESKRIDGE
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 26; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note
9, at 1237.
104. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 123; see also id. at 104–05.
105. Id. at 17; see also id. at 111, 121, 123, 166, 186. Eskridge and Ferejohn call this process
of implementing a putative superstatute “administrative constitutionalism.” Id. at 26, 33, 186.
They argue that administrative constitutionalism is “the dominant governmental mechanism for
the evolution of America’s fundamental normative commitments.” Id. at 33; see also id. at 72–73,
214, 266; cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013)
(arguing for a broad conception of “administrative constitutionalism”).
106. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 17; see also id. at 105, 111, 123,
166, 422.
107. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1237; see also ESKRIDGE
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over skeptics,”108 and the new principle becomes “entrenched . . . into American
public life.”109 Then “we’d say the law has become a superstatute.”110 Though
superstatutes ultimately must yield to the Constitution, through extended public
deliberation and evolution they acquire a “normative force”111 that makes them
“resistant to change” and “gives them a power beyond their formal legal ambit.”112
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that the evolution of public law through
superstatutes, which they term “small ‘c’ constitutionalism,”113 is normatively
superior to amendments of the large “C” Constitution.114 The “fundamental
institutions and norms of our democracy” must be stable over time, adaptable to new
circumstances, and legitimized through “popular deliberation.”115 Superstatutes meet
those qualifications.116 They “provide[] a mechanism whereby a great principle can
be recognized and entrenched, but the details worked out by experts and institutions”
and then altered to respond to changing circumstances.117 The Constitution, on the
other hand, is “too old to answer most of the looming social, political, and moral
questions that Americans want answered”:118 it is too difficult to amend through the
Article V process;119 it governs only government, not private, action;120 and it does
not address the government’s duty “to create and guarantee affirmative and positive
legal regimes” that give citizens “ample room to make the choices that fulfill their
needs and desires.”121
Eskridge and Ferejohn also posit that the law is better developed through
superstatutes than through judicial constitutional interpretation.122 “[A] really
thoughtful decision by nine unelected wise people is not as legitimate as a decision
made by elected officials with popular input and the possibility of serious
contestation afterwards.”123 The ongoing, dynamic, republican deliberation that
superstatutes endure gives “more opportunities for meaningful public input” and thus
is “more legitimate and . . . more productive” than judicial constitutional change.124
Consequently, the Supreme Court’s greatest “Constitutional triumphs” have been in

& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 7, 19, 78, 454; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes,
supra note 9, at 1273.
108. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 111.
109. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1237.
110. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 111.
111. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1270.
112. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 8; see also id. at 13, 27, 28, 64.
113. Id. at 1.
114. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1271–76; see also ESKRIDGE
& FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 8–9, 374.
115. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 44.
116. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 18; see also id. at 303.
117. Id. at 122; see also id. at 263, 334.
118. Id. at 4; see also id. at 37–38.
119. Id. at 4, 49–51, 73.
120. Id. at 4, 25–26.
121. Id. at 4–5, 22 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 9, 25, 42–48, 51–54, 91–95.
122. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1271–76.
123. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 35.
124. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 167; see also id. at 445.
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cases where the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution paralleled norms that had
already become entrenched in superstatutes.125
B. Interpreting Superstatutes
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s work is focused on small “c” constitutional change and
the process by which statutes become entrenched superstatutes. A related, but
separate part of their theory concerns the interpretation of superstatutes. That part of
their theory is not developed as fully but they provide ample material to feed a
discussion of how the APA should be interpreted.
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that superstatutes are and should be interpreted
differently from ordinary statutes and more like the Constitution.126 Descriptively,
they argue that, as superstatutes age, they often reach “beyond and even against the
original congressional expectations.”127 This superstatutory evolution is inevitable,
according to Eskridge and Ferejohn, for three reasons. First, superstatutes tend to be
written using broad language because “they are aimed at big problems and must last
a long time.”128 Even the agency’s initial application of the statute to specific
circumstances “will typically go beyond the expectations, or even the imagination,
of the enacting Congress.”129 Second, the agency officials who implement the statute
have audiences, constituencies, perspectives, and ethical duties that differ from the
statute’s authors in Congress, and those differences grow as time passes.130 Third,
agencies are continually pressed to interpret the statute “to be responsive to new
facts, new needs, [and] new ideas,” and “current rather than historical political
preferences.”131
Superstatutory interpretive evolution is normatively desirable, according to
Eskridge and Ferejohn, because it is more adaptive than Constitutional change.132
Hence, Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that both courts and agencies should interpret
superstatutes in a purposive and dynamic fashion, applying the terms “broadly and
evolutively”133 to implement “statutory purpose and principle as well as
compromises suggested by statutory texts.”134 “Because they evolve, common-law
style,” the interpretation of superstatutes should not be bound by Congress’s original
intent to the same extent as ordinary statutes.135 Thus, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue
that courts interpreting superstatutes should be attentive to Congress’s purposes,

125. Id. at 9; see also id. at 102, 350, 433.
126. See id. at 292.
127. Id. at 263; see also id. at 267.
128. Id. at 267.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 270.
131. Id. at 272–73.
132. Id. at 263, 303, 334; Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at
30–34.
133. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1249.
134. Id. at 1247; see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 291, 293. Eskridge
contends that a statute’s purpose changes over time as interpreters apply the statute to new
circumstances. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 30–31 (1994).
135. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1252.

2015]

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMON LAW

1223

examine the statute’s ongoing legislative and administrative history, and give
agencies room to change their interpretations.136
At first glance, it looks like superstatute theory would support administrative
common law. Yet, applying superstatute theory to the APA yields an unexpected
result because the APA is not a typical superstatute. Typically, federal superstatutes
are implemented and interpreted by a single agency; the APA is not.137 Single-agency
implementation is not a requirement for a statute to become entrenched; “there are
different paths toward entrenchment.”138 For example, state statutory convergences
may become entrenched despite the lack of a single agency at the center of the
interpretive universe. Nonetheless, single-agency implementation is central to
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s contention that superstatutes inevitably evolve and ought to
evolve. That superstatutory evolution may be legitimized by an election. Absent such
direct public engagement, however, Eskridge and Ferejohn ground the legitimacy of
superstatutory evolution on single-agency implementation and interpretation with a
strong connection to the public.139
Eskridge and Ferejohn have not addressed statutes like the APA in their work on
superstatutes, but superstatute theory provides a valuable tool for exploring how the
APA should be interpreted. Applying the theory to the APA enhances superstatute
theory as well by applying it to a new category of statutes. In the next Part, I
demonstrate that the APA has the characteristics of a superstatute.
III. THE APA IS A SUPERSTATUTE
Although Eskridge and Ferejohn have not identified the APA as a superstatute,
they have acknowledged its importance. Eskridge argued that statutes and
regulations are “the primary source of constitutional structures, rules, and rights in
our polity” and the APA provides the framework for much of that lawmaking.140 In
their recent book, Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that “most legally binding rules”
are generated by agencies pursuant to congressional delegations of lawmaking
authority.141 The APA, therefore, provides the “framework for understanding most
national lawmaking and much national adjudication.”142
In this Part, I demonstrate that, like the Voting Rights Act, the APA is entrenched;
it “propounded a bold new principle of law that was enthusiastically received in
Congress, was aggressively implemented . . . , has been accepted by Americans of
all political persuasions, and has been repeatedly reaffirmed by Congress.”143 We the

136. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 293–302. In addition,
interpreters should never forget the government’s “core meta-purposes,” like ensuring security
and equality. See id. at 465–66.
137. See infra Part III.B.
138. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 115.
139. See infra Part III.A.
140. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 5, 12.
141. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 10.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 117. But see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invaliding
coverage formula in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act).
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people “have embraced [its] core principle, and any effort to upend it would be met
with popular unease or outrage.”144
This discussion lays the foundation for my argument that judicial interpretation of
the APA should focus on public deliberation. But I should not have to work too hard
to convince readers that the APA is a superstatute. As Adrian Vermeule pointed out, if
you assembled one hundred legal scholars and asked them to list superstatutes, “[a]
handful of statutes will appear on most lists—say, the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946, which is in many respects the fundamental framework for the modern American
regulatory state, yet which Eskridge and Ferejohn oddly mention only in passing.”145
A. Emerged from a Long Period of Deliberation
With the rise of the administrative state in the early twentieth century came the
conservative drive for administrative reform.146 The American Bar Association
(ABA) led the charge, voicing its concerns through its Special Committee on
Administrative Law, which the ABA’s Executive Committee created in May 1933
in response to the first New Deal.147 Over the years, the ABA’s Special Committee
met, issued reports, and proposed legislation on numerous occasions.148 Before 1937,
however, when the Supreme Court was keeping New Deal programs at bay,149 the
ABA’s proposals gained no traction in Congress.150 In 1938, “[t]he decibel count
rose markedly.”151 The Supreme Court had begun to uphold New Deal programs,152
and although Democrats retained control of Congress, Republicans gained enough
seats to strengthen their coalition with conservative Democrats in the drive for
administrative reform.153 The Senate Judiciary Committee held eight days of

144. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 117.
145. Vermeule, supra note 23. But see Ackerman, supra note 72, at 1750 (“The trouble
comes when we compare the cases and landmark statutes on our lists. Mine might contain the
Administrative Procedure Act, but yours might not.”); Frymer, supra note 9, at 234–35
(suggesting that the APA might or might not appear on one’s list of superstatutes).
146. Paul Frymer contends that “almost all of the superstatues [Eskridge and Ferejohn]
engage derived initially from progressive movements on the left.” Frymer, supra note 9, at 235.
A notable exception is the Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. ch. 3 (2012)), which resulted from the pressure of corporate
capitalists and bankers. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 335–39.
147. See Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 682.
148. See, e.g., id. at 679, 682, 684–85, 693–96; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1569–77,
1582–83, 1588–94, 1639–40, 1644–47, 1649–50.
149. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (striking
down the Frazier-Lemke Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (invalidating regulations issued under the National Industrial Recovery Act).
150. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 681–83; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1569.
151. Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV.
219, 221 (1986).
152. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act); W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding
minimum wage law for women and minors).
153. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 683–84; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1580–82, 1586.
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hearings on an administrative courts proposal early that year.154 That bill died in
committee.155 The ABA’s new proposal, introduced in Congress in 1939, came to be
known as the Walter-Logan bill.156
In an effort “to deflect the new momentum for strict control of agencies that the
introduction of the ABA bill had sparked,” President Roosevelt instructed the
Attorney General to form a committee to study administrative reform.157 The
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure included twelve
practitioners, judges, and professors—eight New Deal supporters and four
conservatives.158 The Attorney General’s Committee constructed an enormous
record of current administrative practices and discussed potential legislative
proposals.159 For each of twenty-seven federal agencies, the Committee staff
interviewed agency officers and employees, as well as lawyers who practiced before
the agency; drafted a monograph about the agency; solicited comments on the draft
from the agency; and held public hearings.160
Meanwhile, Congress debated the Walter-Logan bill extensively. A
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on April 5, 1939.161
The Senate debated the bill on June 13, 1939, and the issue “began to attract intense
national attention.”162 The House debate spanned four days in April 1940, and the
bill passed the House by a vote of 282 to 96.163 The Senate debated the bill again on
November 19, 1940, and passed the bill with amendments by a vote of 27 to 25.164
The House debated and concurred in the Senate amendments by a vote of 176 to 51
on December 2, 1940.165 All in all, the floor debates leading to the passage of the
Walter-Logan bill span more than one hundred pages in the Congressional Record.166
President Roosevelt vetoed the Walter-Logan bill in part because he wanted to
wait for the report of the Attorney General’s Committee “before approving any
measure in this complicated field.”167 The House debated the bill again and fell 34

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1588–89.
Id. at 1588–90.
Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 685.
Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1594.
Id. at 1595.
See COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1941) [hereinafter AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT].
160. A.H. Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 589,
589–90 (1941); see also Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1596. The Committee’s staff included
Walter Gellhorn and Kenneth Culp Davis. Id. at 1595.
161. Administrative Law: Hearings on H.R. 4236, H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324 Before
Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 19 (1939).
162. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1602; see also 84 CONG. REC. 7075–78 (1939).
163. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 688–89; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1606, 1619;
see also 86 CONG. REC. 4742–44 (1940).
164. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1620–22; see also 86 CONG. REC. 13,747–48 (1940).
165. 86 CONG. REC. 13,815–16 (1940).
166. 84 CONG. REC. 7075–78 (1939); 86 CONG. REC. 4530–48, 4590–605, 4646–75,
4722–44, 13,743–48, 13,807–16 (1940).
167. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The President Vetoes the Bill Regulating Administrative
Agencies, Note to the House of Representatives, Dec. 18, 1940, in 9 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 616, 620 (1941).
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votes short of overriding the President’s veto.168 About a month later, the Attorney
General’s Committee issued its 474-page report.169 The report described the history
of administrative government and the organization and procedure of existing
agencies; discussed rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial review; and included two
draft bills: a liberal “majority bill” and a conservative “minority bill.”170 Both bills
were introduced in the Senate.171
In the spring and summer of 1941, the Senate Judiciary Committee held
twenty-five days of hearings, producing a transcript of 1621 pages.172 The Committee
heard from numerous agencies; members of the Attorney General’s Committee; the
ABA and other bar associations; and groups representing business interests and
administrative practitioners, professors, and labor interests, among others.173 Before
Congress could take further action on administrative reform, war came, and other
matters commanded Congress’s attention.174
Congress returned to the task of administrative reform two weeks after D-Day in
1944, when Senator McCarran and Representative Sumners introduced a bill that the
ABA Committee had designed as a compromise between the Attorney General’s
Committee’s majority and minority bills.175 McCarran and Sumners reintroduced a
revised bill in the new Congress in 1945, and the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees proceeded in private through a series of closed-door negotiations with
the Attorney General and private interests, including the ABA.176 The Senate
Judiciary Committee solicited comments on its first revision of the bill and formally
submitted its next draft to the Attorney General, who endorsed the bill, as did the
ABA.177 The Committee passed the bill unanimously and issued a 31-page report
interpreting each of the bill’s provisions.178 The House Judiciary Committee held
three days of hearings in June 1945,179 reported the bill unanimously with minor

168. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1628, 1630.
169. AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159.
170. See id.; see also Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1632–36.
171. S. 675, 77th Cong. (1941); S. 674, 77th Cong. (1941); see also Shepherd, supra note
3, at 1636.
172. Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. (1941).
173. See id.
174. Many things changed during the war years, making the APA’s passage possible. See
Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 693–96.
175. S. 2030, 78th Cong. (1944); H.R. 5081, 78th Cong. (1944); see also 68 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 256 (1943); Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1649–50.
The bill was revised and reintroduced in January 1945. S. 7, 79th Cong. (1945); H.R. 1203,
79th Cong. (1945).
176. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 696–97, 701; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1656, 1661.
177. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REP. ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONG. 1944–46, at 11 (1946) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]; Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 699–700, 703; Shepherd, supra note 3, at
1659, 1661–62.
178. See S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
185; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1662.
179. See Federal Administrative Procedure: Hearings on H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R. 1117,
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amendments, and issued a 48-page report.180 The bill passed the Senate and the
House on voice votes that reportedly were unanimous,181 and President Truman
signed the APA into law on June 11, 1946.182
In sum, the APA of 1946 represented Congress’s response to a conservative
movement and emerged from an enthusiastic Congress following years “of public
discussion and official deliberation”183 within and between Congress, the Executive
Branch, the ABA, and the public. The APA easily satisfies the first characteristic for
superstatute status.
B. Altered Regulatory Baselines
For a statute to achieve superstatute status, it should have changed common law
and regulatory baselines.184 This is a characteristic, however, and not a rigid criterion.
An entire chapter of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s book is dedicated to the Sherman
Act,185 which is a superstatute even though its “authors apparently thought they were
federalizing the common law.”186 Statutory provisions that establish new law and
those that restate existing law both may become so entrenched that they qualify as
“super” within the meaning of superstatute theory.
Some of the APA codified existing standards and practices.187 Even before the
APA was enacted, some agencies began to change their procedures in response to

H.R. 1203, H.R. 1206, and H.R. 2602 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong.
(1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 45–130.
180. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
233–82; Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1669.
181. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 344, 406, 423; Shepherd, supra note 3,
at 1668, 1674; The Federal “Administrative Procedure Act” Becomes Law, 32 A.B.A. J. 377
(1946) (“No votes were cast against it.”).
182. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012)).
183. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1231.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.
185. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 119–64.
186. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1234; see also Margaret H.
Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 429, 461–63 (2008).
187. See, e.g., TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 61 (1947) (asserting that § 6(a) “restates existing law
and practice that persons compelled to appear in person before an agency or its representative
must be accorded the right to be accompanied by counsel”); see also SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE PRINT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
11, 31 (“The provision relating to burden of proof is the standard rule.”); H.R. REP. NO.
79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 235, 276 (explaining
that section 10(b) “does not alter venue provisions under existing law”); 92 CONG. REC. 5654
(1946) (statement of Rep. Francis Walter) (stating that the venue requirements codified
existing law); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 310 (2012) (“Our contemporary
transsubstantive administrative law is built on the foundation of administrative practices that
long antedate the APA’s codification.”); id. at 311 (arguing that today’s law “is in many ways
a codification of the best practices generated in administrative law’s first century”).
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the growing interest in administrative reform,188 leading the Attorney General’s
Committee to assert that “[i]n the best existing practices are embodied the
fundamentals of fair administration.”189 That much of the Act codified existing law,
however, does not detract from its status as a superstatute because the provisions that
codified existing law are equally, if not more, entrenched than the provisions that
created new law. Take, for example, the model of judicial review of agency action
that parallels appellate court review of trial court judgments. Under the appellate
review model, the court’s review is based on a record produced by the agency, the
standard of review is based on “conventional understandings” of the relative
competence of the court and the agency, and those understandings “are grounded in
the law-fact distinction.”190 Professor Merrill showed that this model of judicial
review already had been imported into administrative law before it was incorporated
into the APA, and it is now “so deeply entrenched in American political culture that
it is impossible to imagine wrenching free from its influence.”191
In any event, many provisions of the APA were new.192 Certainly Congress would
not have suffered with the Act for so many years merely to restate the common law.
Members of Congress did not think that was all they had accomplished,193 and the
Attorney General would not have needed to publish a manual advising agencies
about complying with the new law194 if the new law were merely a restatement. In
this Part, I highlight a few of the APA’s more obvious breaks with preexisting
administrative law and practice.195

188. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 4, 62; JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE
UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 79 (2012)
(explaining that the APA reflected existing agency practice because agencies “had been trying
to head off these and similar reforms for years”).
189. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 5; see also Present at the Creation:
Regulatory Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 521 (“A lot of the things that seem to me
now to be accepted as good practice were . . . increasingly good practice at the time.”);
GRISINGER, supra note 188, at 77 (asserting that the APA “was an explicit statement of best
practice that effectively indicated Congress’s approval of much of what the administrative
state already did”).
190. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 941 (2011).
191. Id. at 942–43, 1003.
192. See GRISINGER, supra note 188, at 77; Mashaw, supra note 4, at 1367; Present at the
Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 518; id. at 521 (debating the
extent to which the APA was “declaratory”).
193. S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 193;
GRISINGER, supra note 188, at 60; Carl McFarland, Analysis of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INSTITUTE CONDUCTED BY THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW ON FEBRUARY 1–8, 1947 at 17, 23 (1947) [hereinafter NYU INSTITUTE]
(“There certainly is no doubt that, in passing this statute, there was a desire for reform.
Otherwise why would there have been so many bills, so many hearings, so many studies, so
much talk? Congress does not legislate for the fun of it . . . .”).
194. See CLARK, supra note 187, at 6.
195. I leave for another day a discussion of which provisions of § 10 governing judicial
review changed preexisting law.
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One of Congress’s central goals in enacting the APA was to impose some
uniformity on federal agencies.196 When Congress was considering the Walter-Logan
bill, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees lamented the lack of uniformity in
administrative procedure and judicial review of administrative actions.197 Two years
later, in the final report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure, both the liberal majority and the conservative minority recognized the need
for more uniformity.198 When Congress returned to the task of administrative reform
after the war, it reiterated its lament about the lack of uniformity in administrative law,
but this time it followed through on its rhetoric.199 The Walter-Logan bill had included
exemptions for numerous individual agencies, including the Federal Reserve Board,
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.200 In
the APA, Congress abandoned those exemptions. The Senate Judiciary Committee
followed “the undeviating policy” of “deal[ing] with types of functions as such and in
no case with administrative agencies by name.”201 The House followed the same path,
explaining, “The bill is meant to be operative ‘across the board’ in accordance with its
terms, or not at all. . . . No agency has been favored by special treatment.”202 Congress’s
desire for greater uniformity is reflected in the Act itself, from the broad definitions of
“agency,” “agency proceeding,” and “agency action,”203 to section 12’s direction that
“all requirements or privileges relating to evidence or procedure” be applied equally to
all agencies, and its provision that subsequent legislation could only “supersede or
modify” the APA if it did so expressly.204

196. See Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 591, 608; see also Marshall J. Breger, The
APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REV. 337, 344 (1986); Field et al.,
supra note 27, at 67; Metzger, supra note 16, at 1309.
197. S. REP. NO. 76-442, at 9–10 (1939) (laying the blame for “the present situation of
indescribable confusion” primarily at Congress’s feet for allowing the administrative state to
grow “without regard to any uniformity”); H.R. REP. NO. 76-1149, at 3 (1939) (same).
198. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 20, 192, 213. Not everyone agreed.
See John Foster Dulles, The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 617, 623 (1941) (opining that the Attorney General’s Committee had “gone
further than might be wise in attempting to deal through general legislation with all types of
administrative process”).
199. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
243 (quoting S. REP. NO. 76-442, at 9–10 (1939)); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Some Comments
on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. REV. 368, 371 (1946) (commenting that,
compared to the Walter-Logan bill, the APA “is noteworthy for the breadth of its coverage”).
200. Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 684, 687; Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 589.
201. S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 187, 191.
202. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
235, 250.
203. Id. at 255; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
177, at 187, 197–98; Field et al., supra note 27, at 67.
204. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 12, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012)); see also Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955)
(“Exemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be
presumed in view of the statement in § 12 of the Act that modifications must be express.”).
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After the APA’s passage, former adversaries agreed that the Act was designed to
increase uniformity.205 Even the Attorney General agreed that the APA “sets a pattern
designed to achieve relative uniformity in the administrative machinery of the
Federal Government.”206 Within a few years, the Supreme Court joined the chorus
in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, commenting that the Act was intended “to introduce
greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among
the diverse agencies whose customs had departed widely from each other.”207 The
following year, in Universal Camera Corporation v. NLRB, the Court reiterated that
the APA reflected a desire for uniformity,208 and the Court has sustained the
uniformity refrain.209 Of course, Congress itself has undermined its own effort to
enhance uniformity by enacting numerous statutory overlays governing particular
agencies.210 But the APA certainly broke with the past in establishing a uniform floor
for administrative procedure and judicial review of administrative action.211
Another way in which the APA altered regulatory baselines was in requiring
agencies to publish their rules of organization and procedure. Prior to the APA, the
Federal Register Act of 1935 required agencies to publish their substantive
regulations in the Federal Register, but they were not required to formulate, much

205. Carl McFarland, Analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 22 (noting that “a very important purpose of the statute was to
standardize and simplify”); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Procedure and the A.P.A., 24
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 514, 514 (1949) (stating that the APA prescribed “[u]niform standards of
fairness . . . for all federal administrative action”).
206. CLARK, supra note 187, at 5; see also id. at 9; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945); LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 177, at 224 (Letter from Attorney General Clark).
207. 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950). The Court supported this statement with citations to the House
report on the APA, the Attorney General’s Committee report, and Carl McFarland’s statement at
the NYU Institute, as well as the House and Senate reports and the House hearings on the
Walter-Logan bill. Id. Congress overruled the Court’s holding that the APA governed deportation
hearings “almost immediately afterward.” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1991).
208. 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
209. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (holding the APA governs review of
Patent and Trademark Office findings of fact and allowing “grandfathered common-law
variations” to persist based on ambiguous authority would undermine Congress’s intent to
enhance uniformity in administrative law); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t
of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1994) (holding that allowing
agencies to devise their own rules governing the burden of proof in adjudications would
undermine the APA’s goal of achieving greater uniformity in administrative practice); cf.
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) (indicating that
allowing Supremacy Clause claim to proceed alongside APA claim might “threaten[] to defeat
the uniformity that Congress intended by centralizing administration of the federal program in
the agency and to make superfluous or to undermine traditional APA review”); Mayo Found.
for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) (applying Chevron
deference to tax regulation).
210. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 196, at 344–46; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication:
Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65 (1996). The Environmental
Protection Agency, for example, may impose some civil penalties without providing APA
procedures. See William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal
Procedures for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1993).
211. See MASHAW, supra note 187, at 289.
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less publish, rules regarding their own organization or procedure,212 and few agencies
did.213 The Attorney General’s Committee recommended that information
concerning agency organization, policy statements, statutory interpretations,
substantive regulations, rules of procedure, forms, and instructions “be made
available, in orderly and readily accessible form, to the public.”214 Following through
on that recommendation was one of the APA’s “basic purposes.”215 Section 3(a) of
the Act, now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), required agencies to state and publish
descriptions of their organization, including delegations of final authority;
“statements of the general course and method by which [their] functions are
channeled and determined”; and substantive rules, policy statements, and
interpretations.216 Rules of organization and procedure that are not published as
required by section 3 are not binding.217 Thus, section 3 required agencies “to take
the initiative in informing the public” about how they operate.218
Although agencies had become more proactive about publishing their rules as
soon as the Attorney General’s Committee issued its report,219 the requirements of
section 3 were new.220 Members of Congress felt that they were “among the most
important and useful provisions of the bill.”221 Section 3 led agencies to assemble

212. Federal Register Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-220, § 5(a), 49 Stat. 500, 501 (codified at
44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)(2) (2012)) (requiring publication of “documents or classes of documents
that the President may determine from time to time have general applicability and legal effect”);
see also AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 25–26, 225; David Reich, Administrative
Procedure Act: Analysis of its Requirement as to Rule-Making, 33 A.B.A. J. 315, 316 (1947)
[hereinafter Reich, Analysis]; David Reich, Rule Making Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 495–96; Ashley Sellers, Administrative Procedure
Act: Extent of Agency Compliance with Section 3, 33 A.B.A. J. 7, 7 (1947).
213. AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 26–27 (finding that few agencies issued
“comprehensive or usable statements of their own internal organization,” and although many
agencies were issuing “directions as to practice and procedure . . . [t]hey rarely outline[d] the
whole process”); see also id. at 226 (highlighting that “not a single important agency now
discloses in practical form its own internal organization and set-up”).
214. Id. at 26.
215. CLARK, supra note 187, at 9; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 244–45.
216. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012)); see also Sellers, supra note 212, at 8.
217. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (“No person shall in any
manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.”).
218. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
235, 251; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
187, 193.
219. See Nathanson, supra note 199, at 378.
220. Pat McCarran, Improving “Administrative Justice”: Hearings and Evidence; Scope
of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A. J. 827, 830 (1946); see also Joanna Grisinger, Law in Action:
The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 J. POL’Y & HIST. 379,
406–07 (2008); Sellers, supra note 212, at 7; The Federal Administrative Procedure Act:
Codification or Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 676, 687, 703 (1947).
221. 92 CONG. REC. 5650 (1946) (statement of Rep. Francis Walter); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 235, 255; S. REP.
NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 187, 198.
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their rules in one place, analyze their practices, and state their requirements with
more clarity and detail.222 When section 3 became operative on September 11, 1946,
the Federal Register swelled from its usual length of thirty to sixty pages to almost
1000 pages, despite the fact that many rules were not reprinted, but merely
incorporated by reference to earlier publications.223 Thus, section 3’s publication
requirements altered regulatory baselines.
The APA’s “most important reform” may have been notice and comment
rulemaking.224 Before the APA, statutes generally did not specify rulemaking
procedures or require notice to interested parties.225 Some agencies consulted with
interested parties in rulemaking nonetheless.226 But there were a “multitudinous
variety of procedures” for promulgating regulations with “no unifying principle.”227
The Attorney General’s Committee majority aimed to improve rulemaking “by
emphasizing the importance of outside participation” in the process, but thought that
such consultation should not be statutorily mandated.228 The minority, on the other
hand, included in its proposed bill a provision requiring agencies to provide notice
and some opportunity for public comment.229 The APA followed the minority’s

222. See Louis G. Caldwell, The Federal Communications Commission, in NYU
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 91; Robert E. Freer, An Analysis of Federal Trade Commission
Procedures as They Relate to the Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra
note 193, at 421.
223. Reich, Analysis, supra note 212, at 317; see also David Reich, Rule Making Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 497; Sellers, supra
note 212, at 8.
224. Shepherd, supra note 3, at 1583, 1635; see also, Present at the Creation: Regulatory
Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 520.
225. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 102; Present at the Creation:
Regulatory Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 520.
226. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 103; MASHAW, supra note 187, at
310 (noting that before the APA, some agencies informed the public of rules and guidelines
and consulted with interested groups); see also CLARK, supra note 187, at 31 (explaining that
federal agencies already “extensively employed” informal rulemaking procedures like
“informal hearings (with or without a stenographic transcript), conferences, . . . submission of
written views”); Louis G. Caldwell, The Federal Communications Commission, in NYU
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 94; Roger S. Foster, Application of the Administrative Procedure
Act to the Statutes Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in NYU
INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 214; W. Carroll Hunter, The Administrative Procedure Act in
its Application to the Functions of the Department of Agriculture, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra
note 193, at 377; Bradford Ross, Federal Power Commission Practice and Procedure as
Affected by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at
180; John H. Wanner, Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act upon the Civil Aeronautics
Board, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 119.
227. Feller, supra note 160, at 595. Although the case law at the time was similarly
unsettled, Supreme Court decisions in the early 1940s suggested that “more procedural
protection may need to be thrown around the rule-making process.” C. Herman Pritchett, The
Supreme Court and Administrative Regulation, 1941–1944, 31 IOWA L. REV. 103, 111 (1945).
228. AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 6, 105.
229. Id. at 228. The minority’s proposed bill left to agency discretion the choice of whether to
proceed with written comments, conferences, informal hearings, or formal hearings. Id. at 228–29.
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recommendation.230 Section 4 of the Act, now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553, required
agencies to publish in the Federal Register notice of proposed rulemakings and to
“afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making.”231 That
requirement altered regulatory baselines.232
Another of the APA’s reforms was section 5(c)’s requirement, now codified at 5
U.S.C. § 554(d), that agencies separate the functions of investigators and prosecutors
from adjudicators.233 The Supreme Court observed in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath
that the APA arose from a concern that administrative adjudications could be biased
and arbitrary.234 Merging functions created an “unwholesome atmosphere” for
adjudicating private rights and “weaken[ed] public confidence” in the fairness of
agency decision making.235 Before the APA, agencies varied in their adjudication
procedures and internal structures.236 Some agencies began to shift toward greater
separation of functions in response to the Attorney General’s Committee’s
investigation.237 But the Committee was unanimous in its belief that “this evil”
persisted.238 Section 5(c) of the APA allowed hearing officers to remain in their
agencies, but required them be functionally independent of investigators and
prosecutors.239 The Attorney General’s Manual advised that officers who perform
adjudicating functions should be housed in different units of agencies “to achieve
fairness and independence in the hearing process.”240 Section 5(c) may have been
“[o]ne of the most fundamental changes brought about by the Act.”241

230. Nathanson, supra note 199, at 382; see also Present at the Creation: Regulatory
Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 514, 518, 520.
231. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 4(a)–(b), 60 Stat. 237, 239
(1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)); see also CLARK, supra note 187, at 26.
232. See The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, supra note
220, at 675–76, 703; Ashley Sellers, “Informal” Dispositions Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 32 A.B.A. J. 646, 648 (1946) (“[A] statutory right and form of informal rule
making procedure had to be largely invented . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 62, at 785; Present at
the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, supra note 32, at 521 (stating that “notice and
comment procedure, was original, not merely declaratory of what had already developed”).
233. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(c) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012)).
234. 339 U.S. 33, 37–39 (1950).
235. Id. at 42.
236. See AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159, at 44–45; GRISINGER, supra note 188,
at 69–70; Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Separation of Functions Within Federal Administrative
Agencies: A Comment on the Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure, 35 ILL. L. REV. 901, 907, 911–12, 915, 934 (1941).
237. See Nathanson, supra note 236, at 911–12, 915–16, 934.
238. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 44; see also AG’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159,
at 45; Feller, supra note 160, at 601.
239. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 5(c), 60 Stat. 237, 240 (1946)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 262; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 203.
240. CLARK, supra note 187, at 54–56; see also Grisinger, supra note 220, at 405.
241. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, supra note 220,
at 691, 703; see also Ashley Sellers, Adjudication by Federal Agencies Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 529 (observing that the
separation of functions requirement in § 5(c) was an “age-old maxim of good government,”
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In the very least, the APA’s passage meant that agencies were no longer guided
solely by “common law standards, existing case law, and individual agency
statutes.”242 As Jerry Mashaw observed, “A common law model based on private law
traditions has been replaced by a regime of public law official accountability. This
was and is a major revolution in our administrative constitution’s vision of the
relationship of administration to legal rights.”243 In sum, while some of the APA
codified existing law, many of its provisions established new law, thus demonstrating
this characteristic of superstatutes.
C. Passed the Test of Time
The APA fits comfortably in the model of superstatutes insofar as it has passed
the test of time.244 Many scholars have commented on the APA’s endurance.245
Congress has reaffirmed and expanded the 1946 Act. Later Congresses advanced
the enacting Congress’s project of making agencies more transparent to the
public246 by adding public information and open meeting requirements to section
3 of the Act.247 In 1976, Congress furthered the enacting Congress’s goal of making
hearing officers fair and independent248 by adding a prohibition on ex parte
communications in formal proceedings.249 The addition of a waiver of sovereign

but possibly a “brand-new law, for, curiously enough, court decisions recognizing the rule are
surprisingly obscure”).
242. Grisinger, supra note 220, at 408; see also Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman,
Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 505 (2011) (“The APA transformed federal
administrative law from a loose assortment of constitutional and common law doctrines into a
body of law that centered on a single, overarching statute.”); Carl McFarland, Analysis of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in NYU INSTITUTE, supra note 193, at 27 (stating that the
significance of the APA is that “it is law; it must be obeyed”; the Act is “now the law of the land”);
Schwartz, supra note 205, at 514 (opining that, although the APA was “not revolutionary,” it was
important insofar as it stated the essentials of administrative practice “in statutory form and
impose[d] the best existing procedure upon the administrative process as a whole”).
243. MASHAW, supra note 187, at 315. Mashaw continues by stating that “the revolution is
incomplete” insofar as standing is denied to “beneficiaries of protective legislation” based on
“a vision of negative liberty.” Id.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 103.
245. E.g., William H. Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA.
L. REV. 235, 237 (1986); Beermann & Lawson, supra note 5, at 869 n.81; Levy & Glicksman,
supra note 242, at 508–09; Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, supra
note 32, at 510; Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389,
1391 (1996); see also Craig N. Oren, Be Careful What You Wish For: Amending the
Administrative Procedure Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2004) (arguing the APA has
survived “because courts found ample flexibility in the APA’s terms”).
246. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
247. Freedom of Information Act, ch. 324, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §552 (2012)); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90
Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012)).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 233–241.
249. Government in Sunshine Act § 4 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2012)).
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immunity to section 10 in 1976250 bolstered the enacting Congress’s desire “to
afford a remedy for every legal wrong.”251
Congress has also resisted efforts to upset the original legislative compromise by
further restricting agencies. In the 1950s and 60s, the ABA advanced proposals to,
among other things, create a presumption in favor of formal rulemaking, conform the
rules governing such proceedings to those of the federal courts, hinder agencies from
overruling hearing examiners’ decisions, and intensify judicial review.252 The
“regulatory reform” efforts of the 1970s and 80s would have required de novo
judicial review of all questions of law without deference and cost-benefit analysis of
certain proposed rules.253 Cost-benefit analysis reappeared in the “Contract with
America” in the mid-1990s.254 Current proposals would require formal rulemaking
procedures and congressional approval for rules that would have a significant
economic impact.255 These efforts to rebalance the agreement codified in the 1946
Act have spurred “prolonged and serious” debate256 and generated congressional
reports and hearing transcripts far too numerous to list here.257 To date, however, all
of these efforts have failed.258
D. Affected the Law Broadly
The APA has had a strong gravitational pull on the law, influencing the design
and interpretation of other statutes and the Constitution itself.259 The Act has had

250. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, ch. 7, sec. 702–03, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721, (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2012)).
251. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at
251; S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 193.
252. See Allen, supra note 245, at 238, 241–42; Breger, supra note 196, at 340–41; Ronald
M. Levin, Statutory Reform of the Administrative Process: The American Experience and the
Role of the Bar, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1875, 1880 (2005); Oren, supra note 245, at 1149–50.
253. Allen, supra note 245, at 240; Breger, supra note 196, at 342; Levin, supra note 252,
at 1884–87; Oren, supra note 245, at 1153; see also Ronald M. Levin, Comment, Review of
“Jurisdictional” Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment [hereinafter Levin, Review], 1983
DUKE L.J. 355; James T. O’Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the
Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980).
254. Oren, supra note 245, at 1153–54; see also Levin, supra note 252, at 1887.
255. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2013, H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. (2013);
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2013, H.R. 367, 113th Cong. (2013).
256. Breger, supra note 196, at 340.
257. E.g., Regulatory Reform Act—S. 1080: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory
Reform of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. REP. NO. 113-160 (2013);
H.R. REP. NO. 112-294 (2011); S. REP. NO. 104-89, at 4–5 (1995) (summarizing committee’s
study of regulatory reform “for over two decades”); S. REP. NO. 97-284, at 1–2 (1981) (“S.
1080, the Regulatory Reform Act, is the most recent product of at least seventeen years of
work in the Senate on improving the process by which federal regulations are promulgated
and enforced.”).
258. See Levin, supra note 252, at 1881 (“The judgment of history has been that the 1946
APA reached a basically sound reconciliation of competing considerations . . . .”).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 74–76, 101–102, 112.
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“colonizing effects on other statutes.”260 The APA’s requirement for public notice
and comment in rulemaking, for example, is repeated throughout the U.S. Code,261
as is the arbitrary or capricious standard.262 The Act also has guided the courts’
interpretation of other statutes. For instance, the D.C. Circuit has long turned to APA
case law when applying the arbitrary or capricious standard in the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act.263
More importantly, the APA has taken on the normative gravity that characterizes
a superstatute.264 Gillian Metzger demonstrated that constitutional values infuse
administrative law and, conversely, “ordinary administrative schemes and
requirements . . . can inform judicial understandings of what the Constitution
requires.”265 Due process provides an apt example. The loyalty boards of the late
1940s led to the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Bailey v. Richardson that due process did
not protect a federal employee who was fired for being disloyal because she had no
property interest in her employment.266 Even if she had a property interest, the court
continued, due process would not entitle her to “specificity in charges equivalent to
that of valid criminal charges, confrontation by witnesses, cross examination of them,
and hearing upon evidence openly submitted.”267 That state of affairs did not last
long. As Joanna Grisinger observed, “the APA’s clear statement of administrative
norms—some of which exceeded constitutional requirements—gave American
lawyers a yardstick against which to measure the procedures of the loyalty
program.”268 If it applied in Bailey’s case, the APA would have required the
procedures she desired,269 and the Act soon became “a standard of due process

260. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1235. On the extent to which
the federal APA has colonized state APAs, see generally MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M.
LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (3d ed. 2009); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The
Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297 (1986).
261. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1356(h)(1) (2012); 12 U.S.C. § 2279bb-1(d)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C.
§ 7214(a)(2)(C) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1383b(a)(1) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2) (2012); 25
U.S.C. § 458c(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2012).
262. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3)(A); 30 U.S.C.
§ 1276(a)(1) (2012); 31 U.S.C. § 755(a)(1) (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3) (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(9)(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2) (2012).
263. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 710 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008); In re
Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
264. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27.
265. Metzger, supra note 24, at 484–85, 507; see also Edward L. Rubin, How Statutes
Interpret the Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 297 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org
/forum/how-statutes-interpret-the-constitution (arguing that superstatutes are interpretations
of the Constitution itself).
266. 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918
(1951) (per curiam).
267. Id. at 59.
268. GRISINGER, supra note 188, at 107.
269. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2012) (requiring notice of “the matters of fact and law asserted”);
id. § 556(d) (“A party is entitled to . . . such cross-examination as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts”); id. § 556(e) (“The transcript of testimony and exhibits . . .
constitutes the exclusive record for decision . . . and . . . shall be made available to the parties”);
see also id. § 554(a)(2) (exempting “the selection or tenure of an employee” from the APA’s
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against which other government procedures might struggle to be justified.”270 By
1961, the Supreme Court had changed course and held that what procedures due
process requires turns on the “nature of the government function involved” and the
“private interest that has been affected by governmental action.”271
In sum, the APA bears all the hallmarks of a superstatute.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE APA’S INTERPRETATION
Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that superstatutes are and should be interpreted
broadly and evolutively, potentially exceeding congressional intent.272 That
contention, however, is premised on a public deliberative process that the APA does
not follow. Eskridge and Ferejohn did not discuss superstatutes like the APA whose
interpretation Congress did not delegate to any particular agency. Nonetheless, their
work indicates that courts should hesitate before stretching the terms of the APA.
Instead, courts should focus their review on the history of the Act, both before and
after its enactment, paying particular attention to the legislative compromises
encoded in the Act and any public deliberation it has encountered since 1946.
Applying superstatute theory to the APA does more than demonstrate why
stretching the statute’s terms is problematic, however; it also shows why
administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the APA is particularly
troubling. The problem with administrative common law is not just that common law
is created by countermajoritarian courts; the problem is that, unlike other statutes,
there is no agency that administers the APA and engages in an ongoing dialogue with
the President, Congress, the courts, and the public. Thus, even if administrative
common law can satisfy separation-of-powers and political-accountability concerns,
it still raises public deliberation concerns.
A. The Role of Deliberation in Superstatute Theory
What legitimizes interpreting superstatutes so that they evolve over time, even to
the point of exceeding the enacting Congress’s expectations? Deliberation. In
superstatute theory, deliberation not only leads to entrenchment (that is, it makes
some statutes super), but it also legitimizes evolutive interpretation of superstatutes.
Eskridge and Ferejohn propound a civic-republican model of deliberation that
requires feedback from the public.273 Sometimes the public gives feedback in
elections. For example, Eskridge and Ferejohn assert that the election of national
leaders who endorsed the Justice Department’s interpretation of the Sherman Act
legitimized the Department’s departure from Congress’s original statutory intent.274

adjudication provisions).
270. GRISINGER, supra note 188, at 107; see also Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the
Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism,
1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1429 (2000) (“The demise of the rights/privileges
distinction resulted from the rise of the participatory ideal of policy making.”).
271. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
272. See supra Part II.B.
273. E.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 78.
274. See id. at 162–63.
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The state statutory convergence of married women’s property laws arose through
“legislatures directly accountable to citizens.”275
Even without direct public involvement, however, Eskridge and Ferejohn assert
that superstatutory evolution is legitimate if the interpretive exercise is connected to
the public through an implementing agency. Congress must have delegated
interpretive authority to the agency: “When Congress adopts an ambitious statute and
delegates enforcement authority (as it must) to executive and judicial officers,
Congress ought to expect a dynamic application of the statute . . . .”276 But that
delegation, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify agency-led interpretive
evolution of superstatutes. The best way to legitimize an agency’s dynamic
interpretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn say, is congressional ratification, such as
Congress’s endorsement of the Interior Department’s interpretation of the Endangered
Species Act in the 1982 amendments.277 In the absence of ratification, the agency bears
a greater burden of securing “grassroots support from some other source, including
direct appeals to We the People, Ourselves.”278 Ultimately, “public deliberation” is “the
most plausible mechanism for legitimating dynamic agency interpretations.”279
“Deliberation” in superstatute theory typically involves agency implementation
and public input in a feedback loop.280 First the legislature, responding to popular
will, enacts a statute and delegates its implementation to an agency. The agency plays
a “primary role,” “work[ing] with affected groups to devise a workable
implementation.”281 The public makes its views known to Congress and to the
agency.282 Within the agency, the ideal model for public feedback is rulemaking, in
which the agency gives public notice of its proposal, receives and seriously considers
public comments, and publishes an explanation for its decision that is “cogently tied
to congressional purposes.”283 Finally, “legislators reaffirm and expand upon the

275. Id. at 213; see also id. at 225, 238.
276. Id. at 160; see also id. at 269 (arguing Congress’s delegation of authority to agencies
to interpret a broad statutory term made the agencies’ “purposive expansion of the statute
beyond, and probably against, original congressional expectations . . . not only likely but also
legitimate”). Expansive application of the Clean Water Act was legitimate because Congress
delegated to EPA and the Corps authority to interpret the statute’s broad terms. Id. at 269.
277. Id. at 274, 297.
278. Id. at 264; see also id. at 289 (arguing dynamic interpretation of superstatutes “ought
to be publicly justified and debated, at least through agency rule making and perhaps through
formal congressional action”).
279. Id. at 161.
280. See id. at 19, 105.
281. Id. at 23, 26; see also Stephen M. Griffin, The National Security Constitution and the
Bush Administration, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 367 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org
/forum/the-national-security-constitution-and-the-bush-administration
(observing
that
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s model of administrative constitutionalism “does not appear to allow
for” the possibility that the President could initiate small “c” constitutional change via, for
example, the Commander-in-Chief power).
282. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 23, 26.
283. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 37; see also infra text
accompanying note 368. Agencies may trigger public feedback in other ways. The Justice
Department’s interpretation of the Sherman Act, for example, has been propounded and
debated in amicus briefs, law review articles, empirical studies, policy papers, and
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statutory scheme.”284 This model of deliberation incorporates administrative-law
values like public participation, reason-giving, and transparency; central to this
model is “feedback” directly from “We the People,” as well as from experts,
regulated entities, and critics.285
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that this type of agency-centered deliberation has
“dual virtues”: it improves the quality of public policy and provides legitimacy.286
For deliberation to have “legitimating value,” it must have three “key features.”287
First, it must respond to both the deep and the urgent needs of “We the People.”288
Second, it must continue with executive agencies typically taking the lead and
Congress and the courts providing input.289 Third, it requires “feedback from outside
the government.”290 It is the “strong connection to the people and popular needs” that
legitimizes evolutive interpretation of superstatutes.291 Eskridge and Ferejohn

“presidential jawboning that the American consumer paid lower prices because government
policy was protecting, but not overprotecting, the free market.” ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN,
REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 158.
284. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 23; see also id. at 14. A classic
example of this feedback loop is the Endangered Species Act. Endangered Species Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1531 (2012)). Congress delegated to the
Department of the Interior the authority to interpret the Act. The Department issued a regulation
interpreting the Act’s ban on “harming” listed species as including destruction of the species’
habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2015). When Congress amended the Act in 1982, it ratified that broad
interpretation. Endangered Soecies Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Statl 1411
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a); see also id. at 274, 296–97.
285. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original). The judiciary also plays a role in integrating the statute
“into the nation’s other normative commitments” and monitoring agencies. Id. Emily
Hammond points out that agencies and courts engage in dialogue, particularly in the course of
serial litigation. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011). See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Dialogue,
Deferred and Differentiated, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 185 (2012). Gluck and Bressman’s
recent empirical research, however, throws into doubt the traditional assumption that the
courts and Congress communicate with each other effectively. See Bressman & Gluck, Part
II, supra note 42, at 765–77. Instead, Gluck and Bressman “paint a picture of legislative
staffers in a primary interpretive conversation with agencies, not with courts.” Id. at 728
(emphasis in original); see also id. at 765, 767, 776–77.
286. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 158; see also id. at 27, 103. In
construing deliberation as “a means by which opponents are brought around to agreement,”
Eskridge and Ferejohn go beyond “the modern normative literature of deliberation” to
“something more nuanced and novel.” McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 389–90. In
conceiving of deliberation as a means of improving the quality of public policy, Eskridge and
Ferejohn answered Lisa Schultz Bressman’s call for scholarship that treats prevention of arbitrary
agency action as central to both “good regulatory government” and “legitimate regulatory
government.” Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 494 (2003) (emphasis in original).
287. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27, 103–04 (emphasis in
original).
288. Id. at 103.
289. Id. at 103–04.
290. Id. at 104.
291. Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1276; see also Griffin, supra
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propound a “broadly ambitious notion of deliberation” as “a mechanism of sharing
assumptions, debating basic norms, grappling with matters of implementation, and
changing hearts and minds.”292
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s entire theory is built on the normative superiority of
deliberation that involves the public and representative branches of government
rather than just the parties to a particular case and unelected judges. The process by
which a statute becomes entrenched and that justifies evolutive interpretation of
superstatutes involves Congress, agencies, and the public coming to a consensus, not
simply the courts making pronouncements. The version of republican deliberation
Eskridge and Ferejohn espouse is “accountable to stakeholders”; that accountability is
strongest for members of the House of Representatives and weakest for judges who
“do not face the voters at all.”293 Thus, although many administrative common law
doctrines reflect ongoing dialogue between the federal courts (particularly the D.C.

note 281, at 384 (explaining that superstatute theory “depend[s] upon extensive public
deliberation to ensure that the constitutional changes that [it] describe[s] are accepted as
authoritative”). Scholars have questioned the value of administrative deliberation generally.
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1703–19 (2012); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of
Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397,
1426–35, 1444 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics]; Jonathan Weinberg, The
Right To Be Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 178–90 (2012). But see Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511 (1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification] (arguing that civic
republican theory justifies giving agencies broad policymaking authority and that agencies are
the best hope for achieving the civic republican deliberative government ideal); Seidenfeld,
The Role of Politics, supra, at 1445–57 (endorsing agency staff-based deliberation coupled
with judicial review). If administrative deliberation generally falls short of superstatute
theory’s ideal, then Eskridge and Ferejohn’s reliance on it may be unjustified. That inquiry is
beyond the scope of this Article.
292. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 394. McCubbins and Rodriguez protest that
that kind of deliberation only exists in rare circumstances and, generally, deliberation merely
yields compromise. Id. at 390–94; see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez,
When Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9 (2006).
The evolutive administrative interpretation of superstatutes that Eskridge and Ferejohn
advocate, however, may undermine compromises that emerged from the original deliberative
legislative process and that became encoded in the superstatute itself. Hence, there is a
fundamental tension between entrenchment through deliberation and dynamic agency
interpretation over time. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 395–97. McCubbins and
Rodriguez suggest that that tension can be resolved either by viewing agency discretion as
inevitable given “the need for flexibility” in public policy or by recognizing that Congress
designs superstatutes to enable that sort of administrative updating. Id. at 397–98. Eskridge
and Ferejohn espouse both resolutions. They clearly see broad administrative discretion in
implementing superstatutes as necessary and inevitable, but their underlying assumption is
that Congress has delegated to the agency the authority to issue binding interpretations of the
superstatute. See supra text accompanying notes 276, 281–283. Professor Eskridge made this
point more explicitly in prior work. ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 112–16; see also William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1457 (2008)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Vetogates].
293. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 15 (emphasis omitted).
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Circuit294) and the legal community, that sort of engagement does not satisfy Eskridge
and Ferejohn’s call for a civic-republican type of deliberation that engages the public.
This aspect of superstatute theory has a long pedigree. “In its most general form,
the demand for deliberation has been a familiar theme in the American constitutional
tradition. It is integral to the ideal of republican government as the Founders
understood it.”295 More recently, Jeremy Waldron explained why judicial
deliberation falls short of the republican ideal. He asserted that political disagreement
is inevitable. Thus, for a decision to be authoritative, it is not sufficient for the
decision to be “right.” Instead, the decision must result from a fair process.296
Majority rule inevitably leaves some people subject to laws they think are unjust, but
it is fair insofar as it gives “equal weight to each person’s view.”297 Courts also reach
results some people believe are unjust, but they have
one legitimacy-related defect that popular majoritarianism does not have:
they do not allow a voice and a vote in a final decision-procedure to every
citizen of the society; instead they proceed to make final decisions about
the rights of millions on the basis of the voices and votes of a few.298
Thus, Waldron called it “something of an insult” to relegate the resolution of
disagreements to a handful of judges who, like a legislature, will often disagree
among themselves and, like a legislature, will resolve their own disagreements by a
majority vote.299 If disagreements are to be settled by “counting heads,” then it should
be the heads of the citizens’ accountable representatives that are counted.300
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson also question the superiority of judicial
deliberation. That supposed superiority is premised on the assumptions that
legislators, because they must stand for election, will necessarily reflect the
preferences of their constituents, while judges “will have more regard for
well-reasoned principles.”301 Gutmann and Thompson challenge those assumptions,
pointing out that because legislators “must defend their policies to many different
groups,” they are “forced to formulate generally acceptable policies, and justify them
by general principles.”302 Judges, in contrast, decide particular cases, hearing only
from the citizens that appear as parties to the case and thus often pronounce narrow
principles without considering the “larger social implications of their decisions.”303

294. The D.C. Circuit is “the nation's premier administrative law court,” Jean Galbraith
& David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 758 (2014),
because it has exclusive jurisdiction over many administrative law matters and concurrent
jurisdiction over most others. See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different?
A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 389 (2006).
295. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 12 (1996).
296. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 213, 253 (1999).
297. Id. at 114 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 247.
298. Id. at 299.
299. Id. at 15.
300. Id. at 15, 90–91; see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 126–29
(1999).
301. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 295, at 45.
302. Id.
303. Id.

1242

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1207

Mark Seidenfeld agrees that courts are “necessarily reactive,” are not “designed to
develop a consensus about the public good,” and “are too far removed from the voice
of the citizenry” to ensure that their policies will be generally acceptable.304
Eskridge and Ferejohn echo these refrains. To them, the Supreme Court is not an
“exemplary deliberative body.”305 Judicial deliberation “values detachment from
politics, principled reasoning from uncontested premises, and case-by-case
incrementalism.” In a democracy, however, “deliberation should be politically
engaged as well as rational, should be forward-looking and openly normative as well
as principled, and should engage in wholesale and not just retail rule making.”306
Judicial review’s proper role is in checking interpretations that exceed legislative
authorizations or “fall athwart larger normative commitments.”307 It is not the role of
the courts to ignore or countermand the results of republican deliberation.
B. The Lack of Agency-Centered Deliberation in the APA
Although the APA is an entrenched superstatute, it does not have the same
lifecycle as other superstatutes. Perhaps the closest analogies Eskridge and Ferejohn
discuss are the state statutory convergences in the family law arena. Like the APA,
the married women’s property laws and no-fault divorce laws became entrenched
without a single agency at the center of the interpretive universe. But that analogy
does not justify evolutive interpretation of the APA “beyond and even against the
original congressional expectations.”308 In their chapter from A Republic of Statutes
discussing state family law, Eskridge and Ferejohn do not allege that the individual
state statutes that make up a superstatutory convergence should be interpreted
evolutively; rather they focus on the process by which the norm in a series of similar
state statutes can become entrenched through state legislative action and periodic
elections, ultimately leading to a convergence across states.309 The connection to the
public in that model is through elections. Similarly, Eskridge and Ferejohn assert that
the election of national leaders who endorsed the Justice Department’s new,
evolutive interpretation of the Sherman Act justified exceeding the enacting
Congress’s intent.310 Unlike the state family law convergences and the Sherman Act,

304. Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 291, at 1542–43.
305. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 21.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 24; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies To
Interpret Statutes, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 411 (2013) (arguing that agencies are superior to courts
in statutory interpretation, but courts play an important role in monitoring agency dysfunction).
308. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 263, 267.
309. See id. at 213, 225, 238. This focus is not surprising, since superstatute theory is
primarily a theory of small “c” constitutional change.
310. Id. at 162–63. “The primary purpose of antitrust law has changed in the past century
—from protection of diffused industry structures and of small competitors . . . to maximization
of consumer welfare, with tolerance for a great deal of market concentration.” Id. at 121
(emphasis in original). That evolution of the Sherman Act was justified not only because the
public endorsed it in national elections, but also because “Americans have voted with their
feet on the issue of localism versus lower prices,” opting for Lowe’s and Home Depot instead
of “the local hardware store.” Id. at 163.
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however, elections have not endorsed the courts’ evolutive, common law expansion
of the APA beyond the boundaries of the text and contrary to Congress’s intent.311
Superstatute theory typically depends on an agency-centered deliberative
feedback loop to justify evolutive interpretation of federal superstatutes. Unlike the
typical superstatute, however, the APA is not administered by a single agency.
Congress did not vest any single agency with the power to interpret the statute in
rules or orders.312 It did not anticipate that the statute would be updated
administratively. To the contrary, Congress anticipated that it would have to update
the statute itself.313 Certainly, federal agencies interpret the APA. All federal
agencies do so as they go about their regulatory business; the Justice Department
does so in litigation; the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the
Office of Management and Budget does so in the course of reviewing agencies’
regulatory proposals; and the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) does so as it studies federal administrative procedure. But none of those
activities results from a congressional delegation of interpretive authority as it must
to justify evolutive interpretation,314 and only ACUS arguably meets superstatute
theory’s other deliberative demands. Thus, in the case of the APA, agencies are not
at the center of the deliberative universe; courts are, and courts do not engage in the
civic-republican style of deliberation that superstatute theory demands. Therefore,
that model of deliberation does not legitimize evolutive interpretation of the APA.

311. The Sherman Act is also distinguishable from the APA because it is administered by its
“primary enforcement agent,” the Department of Justice. See id. at 127; see also id. at 134, 140–
41, 153–57. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend for the Sherman
Act to halt the development of antitrust common law. Lemos, supra note 186, at 429, 461–63.
312. See Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims: Has It
Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 67 (2011). This lack of single-agency
administration sets the APA apart from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 43
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012), another obvious candidate for superstatute status. Like the
APA, NEPA is not administered by a single agency. Unlike the APA, a particular agency, the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), interprets NEPA in regulations. “NEPA established
CEQ to assist and advise the President on environmental policy, and a 1977 Executive Order
charged CEQ with issuing regulations to federal agencies for implementation of NEPA’s
procedural provisions,” and the Court gives CEQ’s regulations “substantial deference.” Winter
v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 50 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989). But see Richard
Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal
and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 Geo. L.J. 1507, 1563 (2012) (pointing out that questions
at the oral argument in Winter indicated that “the Justices may harbor some significant doubts
about [CEQ’s] legitimacy”).
313. S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 177, at 187,
216–17. The House ended its report saying: “This bill is not, of course, the final word. It is a
beginning. If it becomes law, changes may be made in the light of further experience; and
additions should be made.” H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 177, at 235, 282.
314. See supra text accompanying note 276.
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1. All Agencies
Each federal agency must interpret the APA in the course of its operations, and
many agencies issue regulations doing so. For example, the Director of the Federal
Register has issued regulations interpreting section 552(a)’s provision for publication
by reference, which requires his approval.315 The FAA’s regulations interpret the
APA’s rulemaking provisions.316 The Department of Labor’s regulations interpret
the adjudication provisions.317 And the Department of Health and Human Service’s
regulations explain when a hearing examiner’s decision becomes “final agency
action” under the APA.318
None of those interpretations, however, results from statutory authorization to
interpret the APA itself, none is binding on any other agency, and none is entitled to
deference.319 In declining to defer to agency interpretations of the APA, courts have
reasoned that the APA is not within any particular agency’s expertise, and no agency
has been charged with its administration.320 Thus, Congress has no reason “to expect
a dynamic application of the statute.”321 In addition, if multiple agencies interpret the
same statute, consistency in their interpretations is far from assured.322
By the same token, agency interpretations of the APA are too diffuse to meet
superstatute theory’s demand for public deliberation. In a “model deliberation,” the
agency “considers inputs from a variety of sources” and “accommodates larger
public norms.”323 But the APA’s effect on the public is indirect. Thus, one wouldn’t
expect the general public to be aware of, much less participate in, for example, the
FAA’s development of regulations governing how it develops regulations. Certainly

315. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012); 1 C.F.R. § 51.1 (2014).
316. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); 14 C.F.R. §§ 11.1–11.101 (2014).
317. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–557 (2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.1–18.31 (2014).
318. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 81.104 (2014).
319. See Jellum, supra note 312.
320. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (holding Director of
the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’ interpretation of APA was not entitled to
Chevron deference in part because the APA “is not a statute that the Director is charged with
administering”); Prof’l Reactor Operator Soc’y v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(“[R]eviewing courts do not owe the same deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutes
that, like the APA, are outside the agency’s particular expertise and special charge to
administer.”); Air N. Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 937 F.2d 1427, 1436–37 (9th Cir. 1991); Cass
R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 209 (2006); see also Bowen v. Am. Hosp.
Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (explaining that where multiple agencies promulgated
regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, “[t]here is . . . not the same basis for deference
predicated on expertise”).
321. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 160; see also id. at 269.
322. Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Where
a statute is generic, two bases for the Chevron presumption of implied delegation are lacking:
specialized agency expertise and the greater likelihood of achieving a unified view through the
agency than through review in multiple courts.”); Rapaport v. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212,
216–17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The alternative would lay the groundwork for a regulatory regime in
which either the same statute is interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency
that happens to reach the courthouse first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all.”).
323. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 265.
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stakeholders will take notice and the public will too on some occasions, such as when
an agency decides its action falls within an exception to section 553’s rulemaking
requirements. Typically, however, when agencies interpret the APA in the normal
course of business, the public input will lack the “strong connection to the people
and popular needs” that superstatute theory requires to legitimize evolutive agency
interpretation.324
2. The Department of Justice
The most authoritative executive branch interpretations of the APA come from
the Justice Department in litigation and particularly from the Office of the Solicitor
General in the Supreme Court. While Congress has authorized the Attorney General
to represent the United States in court,325 it has not authorized him to issue binding
interpretations of the APA and thus has no reason to expect the Act to evolve at his
hands.326 In addition, although the Justice Department certainly deliberates carefully
about the positions it takes in litigation, and often reconciles multiple agency
viewpoints, that process is not the sort of civic republican deliberation that is central
to Eskridge and Ferejohn’s contention that superstatutes should evolve common-law
style.327 The give-and-take between the executive and judicial branches in litigation
is largely deaf to the public’s voice.328
3. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
OIRA fosters significant deliberation in the development of regulations.329 Since
the Reagan administration, executive orders have charged OIRA, which is part of the
Executive Office of the President, with reviewing certain regulatory actions.330 OIRA

324. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1276.
325. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012).
326. See supra text accompanying note 276.
327. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 27 (“[W]e have a dynamic,
problem-solving, and republican understanding of deliberation.”); see also id. at 21 (noting
that the title of the book “mobilizes not only the interactive, forward-looking understanding of
deliberation suggested here, but also the classic republican notion of citizens and public
leaders acting for the common good”). The lack of republican deliberation may explain
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s assertion that “deference is not appropriate for agency litigating
positions.” Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note 9, at 1252.
328. The Solicitor General’s Office meets regularly with litigants, as well as other entities
that are interested in cases, but those meetings “are not publicly noted . . . because there really
isn’t a mechanism to do so.” Tom Goldstein, Practice Before the Office of the Solicitor General:
Few Secret Meetings, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Jan. 17, 2010, 9:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2010/01/practice-before-the-office-of-the-solicitor-general-few-secret-meetings-2/; see also
Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here To Help”: Obtaining Amicus
Support From the Federal Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
209, 215–22 (2009).
329. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013).
330. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 P ACE ENVTL. L.
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functions as, “in large part, an information aggregator,” collecting input on proposed
regulations from “a wide range of sources both inside and outside the federal
government.”331 It also meets with members of the public and works to ensure that
the public-comment process functions properly so that the voices of state and local
governments, businesses, and public-interest groups are heard.332 And OIRA
promotes public transparency by posting some information about regulatory
proposals on the internet.333 Thus, OIRA arguably fosters deliberation.334
The content of OIRA’s deliberation, however, may not be publicly disclosed,335
and OIRA plays a passive role: it does not “affirm positions, volunteer information,
or answer questions.”336 In addition, OIRA’s review process “diffuses power to such
an extent” between OIRA itself, other White House offices, and other agencies, “that
at the end of the day, no one is accountable for the results it demands.”337 The quality
of its deliberation in a civic republican sense is thus questionable.338

REV. 325, 327–41 (2014).
331. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1840; see also Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation
Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1811–12 (2013). But see Heinzerling,
supra note 330, at 345–46 (finding it “hard to make sense of Sunstein’s portrait of OIRA”).
332. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1841, 1859–60.
333. See OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., www.reginfo.gov.
334. See Nou, supra note 331, at 1812; Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 62 (2009) (“Given that prompt letters
communicate the views of the executive branch to agencies in a transparent manner that
permits public scrutiny and debate, prompt letters further accountable and transparent
decisionmaking.”).
335. See Heinzerling, supra note 330, at 353–55; McGarity, supra note 291, at 1735–37
(describing the lack of transparency in the OIRA review process); Nou, supra note 331, at
1823–24 (“Despite provisions under current executive orders for agencies and OIRA to
disclose the changes made as a result of the presidential review process, such disclosures are
not regularly made in practice . . . .”); Dan Farber, Confessions of a Regulatory Czar, LEGAL
PLANET
(Feb.
20,
2013),
http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/19886/
(“[D]ecision-making may be hidden in a fog of informal interactions within not only the White
House but the entire executive branch . . . .”).
336. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1860.
337. Heinzerling, supra note 330, at 326; Farber, supra note 335 (opining that OIRA
review “dilutes the views of the actors with the most specific expertise” and “reduces
responsibility and accountability within the executive branch”); Heinzerling, supra note 330,
at 342 (“[I]t was often hard to tell who exactly was in charge of making the ultimate decision
on an important regulatory matter.”); id. at 346 (“[A] free-for-all of regulatory power has
emerged, with no one clearly in charge.”).
338. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 15 (explaining that in
“republican deliberation” participants must contribute to the conversation according to “their
comparative advantages,” be open to different viewpoints, and “answer for the choices they
make”); see also Heinzerling, supra note 330, at 364–65 (observing that opacity in government
“prevents people from understanding the way their government operates, how they can
intervene and at what points, what the government is up to, who is making important decisions,
[and] why the government has made those decisions”); McGarity, supra note 291, at 1755–56
(noting that “[t]ransparency enhances the legitimacy of the rulemaking process . . . and
generally enhances the quality of the policy decisions that underlie the resulting rules”).
OIRA’s dubious deliberative process may contribute to what scholars claim is “a profound
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Moreover, there is no indication that OIRA’s deliberation focuses regularly on the
meaning of the APA. The governing executive order defines OIRA’s role relative to
particular “regulatory actions,” not to the regulatory process generally.339 Even
where OIRA “engages lawyers throughout the executive branch to help resolve . . .
questions of administrative procedure,”340 that inquiry necessarily will come in the
context of a particular rule making. For example, if OIRA inquires whether a
proposed guidance document or interpretive rule requires notice-and-comment rule
making under section 553 of the APA,341 it may foster deliberation about the meaning
of section 553, but only with regard to that particular guidance document or
interpretive rule.342 OIRA’s deliberation, therefore, does not legitimize evolutive
interpretation of the APA.
4. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
Finally, ACUS engages the public in deliberation about the meaning of the APA
but falls short of superstatute theory’s demands nonetheless. The Conference is
composed of a presidentially appointed chair, a representative of each federal
agency, and other individuals appointed by the President or the conference chair.343
Congress charged ACUS with studying and making recommendations concerning
federal administrative procedure, as well as collecting and enabling the exchange of
information that might improve administrative procedure.344 Over the years, ACUS
has produced important studies and recommendations, some of which contributed to

institutional bias against regulation.” Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (2006); see also David M.
Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 378–80 (2006) (stating
that OIRA acts as an antiregulatory “one-way ratchet”); Editorial, Stuck in Purgatory, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A22 (calling OIRA “one of the most formidable obstacles to reform”).
339. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); id. at 641 (defining “regulatory
action” as “any substantive action by an agency . . . that promulgates or is expected to lead to
the promulgation of a final rule or regulation”). Executive Order 12,866 also appointed the
OIRA Administrator as the convener of a Regulatory Working Group that would analyze
“important regulatory issues.” Id. at 643. That Group “worked reasonably well during the mid
and late 90’s as a collegial venue where regulatory policy officers could share best practices
and vent shared frustrations.” Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and
Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 105 (2011). However, the Regulatory Working
Group is no longer functioning. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The
(Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 997 (2008); Nou,
supra note 331, at 1816.
340. Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1842; see also id. at 1842 n.18 (stating “OIRA does not
have the lead on legal issues”); id at 1872 (explaining that when legal issues arise, “OIRA’s
role will involve convening, not deciding”).
341. See id. at 1853–54.
342. It is not surprising, then, that the vast majority of OIRA’s meetings with people outside
the government are with those who are subject to regulation. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note
338, at 1306–07; McGarity, supra note 291, at 1746; Sunstein, supra note 329, at 1861.
343. 5 U.S.C. § 593 (2012).
344. 5 U.S.C. § 594 (2012).
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the 1976 amendment of the APA.345 Additionally, ACUS makes its process open to
the public.346 Thus, it may provide the best opportunity for the public to provide
feedback about the APA’s interpretation.
Like its predecessors,347 however, ACUS does not have general rule-making
authority under the APA. It may adopt regulations for carrying out its own
functions,348 but Congress did not delegate to ACUS the authority to issue binding
interpretations of the APA. Therefore, Congress has no reason “to expect a dynamic
application of the statute” to emerge from ACUS.349 ACUS may recommend that the
APA be interpreted broadly and evolutively, but absent a delegation of interpretive
authority from Congress, superstatute theory would consider its efforts to exceed the
enacting Congress’s expectations illegitimate.350
In sum, although the APA bears the hallmarks of an entrenched superstatute, it
does not undergo the sort of deliberation that superstatute theory demands to justify
evolutive interpretation. Indeed, as explained in the next Part, superstatute theory
supports stricter adherence to the text of the APA and allegiance to the compromises
encoded in that text.
C. Deliberation-Focused Review of the APA
Eskridge and Ferejohn did not discuss federal superstatutes like the APA that are
not subject to a deliberative feedback loop involving an administering agency,
Congress, the President, the public, and the courts. I apply their theory to this new
category of superstatutes. It is counterintuitive to think of Eskridge and Ferejohn as
cautioning that one hesitate before stretching the text of a superstatute, but in the case
of the APA, that is the result their theory yields.

345. See Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of
Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV.
155, 183–85 (1998); see also Paul R. Verkuil, What the Return of the Administrative
Conference of the United States Means for Administrative Law, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN.
L. 17, 21–25, 30–31 (2012) (describing how ACUS works and listing ACUS studies related
to environmental law).
346. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLIC MEETING POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (2013), available at http://acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Public
%20Meeting%20Policies%20and%20Procedures%20FINAL.pdf; ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PUBLIC COMMENT POLICY, available at http://acus.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/Public%20Comment%20Policy.pdf.
347. For a brief history of ACUS and its predecessors, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ACUS 2.0
and its Historical Antecedents, 36 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 9 (2011).
348. 5 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2) (2012).
349. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 160.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 276, 283; cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (holding that agency statutory interpretations receive Chevron deference
only when the agency’s interpretation has the force of law and that “Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force,” such as rulemaking or adjudication).

2015]

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMON LAW

1249

1. Deliberation-Respecting, -Inducing, and -Rewarding Review
Because the Constitution itself is so hard to amend, the evolution of large “C”
Constitutional law is left to “the potentially countermajoritarian and out-of-touch
discretion of unelected judges.”351 Eskridge and Ferejohn believe the Supreme Court
has steered between “the Scylla of Constitutional ossification and the Charybdis of
Court tyranny” using small “c” constitutionalism, that is, statutory evolution.352 For the
law to evolve through small “c” constitutionalism without undermining democracy,
however,
Eskridge
and
Ferejohn
posit
that
courts
should
be
“deliberation-respecting,”353
“deliberation-inducing,”354
and
“deliberationrewarding.”355
Courts should be “deliberation-respecting” insofar as they should consider
deliberative materials like a statute’s legislative and administrative history, recognize
the “significant normative force” of deliberative processes, and defer to laws and
policies “that reflect the deliberated views of Congress and the president.”356 Thus, the
Supreme Court “ought to give the benefit of every Constitutional doubt” to superstatutes
because they arise from “intense public debate and congressional deliberation.”357
Where the Court believes that Congress, the President, or an agency is skirting
the constitutional edge or “push[ing] superstatutory evolution into significant
collision with other fundamental norms,” Eskridge and Ferejohn suggest that judicial
review should be “deliberation-inducing,” that is, it should invite further
deliberation.358 Similarly, when the political system has been unresponsive or has
broken down, the Court should “reverse the burden of inertia” in Congress359 and
“jump-start the political process by forcing a fundamental normative discussion.”360
In essence, courts should “treat[] the legislative process like a lower court and
impose[] fact finding and other requirements,”361 because “important shifts of a
constitutional magnitude ought not to be made without deliberation that is open and
public; reasoned and factual; and legitimate.”362 Courts may trigger further civic
deliberation by effectively remanding cases to the political branches using, for
example, the canon of constitutional avoidance or void-for-vagueness doctrine.363

351. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 434–35.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 22–23 (emphasis in original).
354. Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
355. Id. at 24 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 435–37; Eskridge & Ferejohn,
Constitutional Horticulture, supra note 2.
356. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 266, 296, 435–36.
357. Id. at 435.
358. Id. at 289, 436 (emphasis omitted).
359. Id. at 24.
360. Id. at 56; see also id. at 288–89, 456. Eskridge and Ferejohn view Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as an example of deliberation-inducing judicial review. Id. at 456.
361. Id. at 435.
362. Id. at 289.
363. See id. at 464. Thus, in Heller v. District of Columbia, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue
that the Court ought to have invoked the avoidance canon and interpreted federal law to
preempt the District’s gun regulation, thus invalidating the regulation, but not ending the
public debate. Id.

1250

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1207

Finally, judicial review should be “deliberation-rewarding”364 or
“deliberation-encouraging,”365 in that courts should defer to agency interpretations
that result from an effective deliberative process.366 When courts interpret
superstatutes they “should be particularly attentive to agency interpretations and the
reasons given by an agency” for its interpretation.367 That deference is due not because
agencies are expert or because they are accountable to the people through the President,
but because their statutory interpretations result from a deliberative, interactive public
process: provision of public notice, receipt and serious consideration of public
comments, and publication of an explanation for the agency’s decision, followed by
judicial review and congressional reaffirmation of the agency’s initiative.368
2. Interpreting the APA
For a typical superstatute, Eskridge and Ferejohn advocate interpretations that
stretch the text, even beyond Congress’s intent. For the APA, such evolutive
interpretation is unjustified. Because there is no single agency charged with
implementing the APA, Congress is the locus of all deliberation about the Act that
involves the public enough to be legitimate. Thus, deliberation-respecting, -inducing,
and -rewarding review focuses the courts’ attention on Congress. Courts should remain
within the boundaries of the APA’s text. To fully understand that text, however, courts
must understand the Act’s history and context, both pre- and post-enactment.
Deliberation-respecting review of the APA requires the courts to give effect to the
compromises encoded in the Act.369 Respecting legislative compromise is critical to
interpreting the APA because the Act itself was a monumental compromise.370 As
the Supreme Court recognized in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, “The Act . . .
represents a long period of study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought
contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces
have come to rest. It contains many compromises and generalities and, no doubt,
some ambiguities.”371

364. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
365. Id. at 279 (emphasis omitted).
366. See id.
367. Eskridge, America’s Statutory “constitution,” supra note 9, at 36.
368. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 161, 265 (“[J]udicial review
of agency interpretations of law ought to be especially deferential when the agency has
engaged in model deliberation . . . .”); see also id. at 277–79; Eskridge, America’s Statutory
“constitution,” supra note 9, at 37 (“I would insist that the democratic accountability reason
for deference be considered more from the bottom up (American people interacting with the
agency) rather than just the top down (President directing the agency to act).”).
369. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 1309; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, supra note
9, at 1247; Strauss, supra note 62, at 768–69, 781, 785.
370. See Kovacs, A History, supra note 39, at 705–06.
371. 339 U.S. 33, 40–41 (1950). The Court went on to say that it should give effect to the
APA’s “remedial purposes,” id. at 41, essentially calling for a purposive approach the Act’s
interpretation. Nonetheless, the Court grappled with the text and legislative history, and ultimately
based its decision on constitutional avoidance doctrine, not legislative purpose. See id. at 48–51.
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The notion that lawmaking inevitably requires legislators to compromise is the
foundation of what John Manning calls “second-generation textualism.”372
Legislative compromises may result in a statute whose means “do not fully
effectuate the ends that inspired” the law.373 Thus, courts that focus on a statute’s
purposes instead of its “implemental detail” risk undermining complex legislative
bargains.374 To respect legislative compromise, second-generation textualists pay
close attention to statutory text.
Eskridge agrees that courts must respect compromises encoded in legislation, but
he disagrees with Manning about what an interpreter examines to understand a
legislative compromise. Where Manning would have courts focus on the enacted
text, Eskridge would have courts consider in addition “the context of the statute, . . .
the explanation of the deal in the committee reports, and the statute’s purpose,” as
well as evidence of interest groups’ views.375 Indeed, as Victoria Nourse points out,
it may be necessary to examine legislative history simply to identify which statutory
provisions are compromises.376 Eskridge and Nourse have the stronger position in
this debate. Some provisions of the APA represent “wins” for the conservative
minority, others reflect the success of the liberal majority to dilute conservative
proposals, and many were compromises.377 The text alone does not reveal which is
which. Hence, to give sufficient weight to the bargain Congress and the President
made in 1946, the courts must understand the APA’s full context and history.378
Deliberation-respecting review also requires the courts to examine ongoing
deliberation on particular provisions of the APA.379 Peter Strauss contends that the
Supreme Court failed to do that when it invalidated a Department of Labor
burden-shifting rule in Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.

372. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1290
(2010).This article appears in an issue honoring Philip Frickey, William Eskridge’s frequent
coauthor. Editor’s Note, 98 CALIF. L. REV. ii (2010).
373. Manning, supra note 372, at 1304.
374. Id.; see also id. at 1290, 1310–11.
375. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2053 (2006)
(reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 633–34 & n.48 (1990).
376. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History
by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 119 (2012) (arguing that one cannot identify compromises in
legislation “without looking at the legislative history and the rules governing it”); see also
Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 42, at 741–43 (pointing out that some kinds of
legislative history reflect legislative intent more accurately than statutory text); Gluck &
Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 911 (calling for “a more nuanced account of how statutes
are produced in the modern regulatory state”); Nourse, supra, at 138 n.296.
377. See generally Shepherd, supra note 3.
378. Cf. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 965 (reporting that in empirical study
of congressional staffers, “legislative history was emphatically viewed by almost all . . .
respondents—Republicans and Democrats, majority and minority—as the most important
drafting and interpretive tool apart from text” (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 967–90
(examining role of legislative history in statutory drafting process and concluding that “the
real question about legislative history is not whether it should be consulted but, rather, how to
separate the useful from the misleading”).
379. Cf. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 297–98.
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Greenwich Collieries.380 The APA provides that “the proponent of a rule or order
has the burden of proof.”381 For decades, the agency had imposed on benefits
claimants only the burden of production.382 The Court invalidated the agency’s
approach, holding that the APA requires claimants to carry the burden of
persuasion.383 Strauss argues that, in reaching that result, the Court ignored
post-1946 legislation, regulations interpreting other statutes, and court decisions.384
If Strauss is correct, the Greenwich Collieries Court did not show sufficient respect
for ongoing deliberation to legitimize its ruling.385
Of course, ongoing deliberation may render administrative common law that once
contradicted Congress’s intent innocuous. Just as the 1982 amendments to the
Endangered Species Act endorsed the Interior Department’s broad interpretation of
“harm,”386 so too might an amendment of the APA endorse a court’s broad
interpretation of the APA. Mere congressional silence is not likely to reflect
sufficient deliberation to legitimize administrative common law that contradicts the
enacting Congress’s intent.387 Chevron, however, may be an exception.

380. See Strauss, supra note 245, at 1413–19 (discussing Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.
Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994)).
381. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).
382. See Strauss, supra note 245, at 1417–19.
383. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 276.
384. Strauss, supra note 245, at 1418–20; Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds
of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 487–88 [hereinafter Strauss, On
Resegregating]. Strauss argues that the APA should not be limited to its ordinary meaning in
1946, but rather is “an evolving statute,” though its “evolution, to be sure, [is] limited by the
possibilities of its text.” Strauss, supra note 245, at 1420.
385. For a typical superstatute, deliberation-respecting review would also entail
considering the statute’s administrative history, that is, how the agency has implemented the
statute. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 266. Since the APA is not
administered by any particular agency, however, such agency-based deliberation is absent. For
the same reason, judicial interpretations of the APA cannot be deliberation-rewarding because
there is no agency interpretation of the APA that is entitled to deference. See text
accompanying notes 319–320.
386. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 274, 297.
387. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 1328–29 (arguing that Congress has not acquiesced in
the presumption of reviewability); Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts
of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317 (2005) (arguing that congressional acquiescence does
not support statutory stare decisis in the federal courts of appeals); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) (arguing that legislative
acquiescence does not justify the “super-strong presumption against overruling statutory
precedents,” id. at 1363, because “[i]n most instances, Congress is either not aware of the
Court’s statutory interpretations or faces no formal opportunity to examine those
interpretations,” id. at 1404, and “[e]ven when those interpretations are brought to the attention
of a congressional committee, the rest of Congress usually remains unaware of them,” id.).
But see Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1461
(2014) (“When the Court has interpreted a statute and Congress has engaged in an open,
deliberative, and pluralistic appraisal of the Court’s decision without overriding it, that ought
to be an additional reason for the Court to be reluctant to overrule its statutory precedent.”).
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Congressional staffers are clearly aware of Chevron’s deference doctrine,388 and in
each new statute providing rule-making authority, Congress may provide that
Chevron does not apply.389 Moreover, Chevron survived efforts to reverse it in the
Bumpers Amendment, which was the subject of significant deliberation.390
The courts’ interpretation of the APA also should seek to induce further
deliberation in Congress. Superstatute theory would not accept judicial
deliberation as a “second best” alternative but instead would prefer that courts
respect, induce, and reward a civic-republican style of deliberation.391 If the
boundaries of the APA’s possible meaning need to be extended, the courts should
prod Congress to extend them.392 Indeed, that appears to be the preference of those
who draft federal statutes. The respondents in Gluck and Bressman’s
groundbreaking empirical study of congressional drafting practices reported that
“they would rather have difficult questions returned to Congress than resolved by
judges.”393 Perhaps the Court in Greenwich Collieries adhered to the APA’s
meaning in 1946 in an effort to encourage Congress to update the statute to
“capture[] the new social and political realities.”394

388. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 927, 993–98.
389. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a),
12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012) (providing that certain rules of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency be reviewed, consistent with Skidmore, based on “the thoroughness evident in
the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consistency
with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which the court finds
persuasive and relevant to its decision”). Thanks to Asher Steinberg for this point.
390. See Levin, Review, supra note 253, at 358–66; O’Reilly, supra note 253, at 747–67.
“The so-called Bumpers Amendment went through several iterations and in its mature form
provided that courts should ‘independently decide all relevant questions of law’ and that ‘in
making determinations on . . . questions of law, the court shall not accord any presumption in
favor of or against agency action.’” William R. Andersen, Against Chevron—A Modest
Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957, 974 (2004).
391. See supra Part IV.C.1; see also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Second Best
& Nonideal Theory, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 14, 2014), http://lsolum.typepad.com
/legaltheory/2014/09/legal-theory-lexicon-second-best-nonideal-theory.html (“[W]hen the
first-best policy option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider
second-best solutions.”).
392. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2165, 2967 (2002) (arguing that canons of statutory interpretation serve
preference-eliciting functions designed “to provoke a legislative reaction that resolves the
statutory indeterminacy and thus creates an ultimate statutory result that reflects enactable
political preferences more accurately than any judicial estimate possibly could”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317, 335 (2000) (arguing that certain
“nondelegation canons” of statutory interpretation, like the canon disfavoring extraterritorial
application of federal law and the canon disfavoring interpretations that raise serious
constitutional doubts, “represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing minimalism, designed
to ensure that certain choices are made by an institution with a superior democratic pedigree”).
393. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 42, at 1015; see also Bressman & Gluck, Part
II, supra note 42, at 773–74.
394. Strauss, supra note 245, at 1421. Congress has not overruled Greenwich Collieries.
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S.
267 (1994).
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The bottom line is that identifying a statute as a superstatute does not necessarily
justify interpreting that statute broadly, much less exceeding Congress’s intentions.
One cannot simply dub the APA a superstatute and announce that it must therefore be
interpreted to evolve beyond the boundaries of the text. Rather, given the extraordinary
legislative process that led to the APA’s enactment and the relative paucity of
agency-based deliberative feedback since then, courts should be particularly cautious
about interpreting the APA’s text in a way that shifts the balance Congress reached
through the political process. Courts should look closely at the APA’s individual
provisions, including Congress’s treatment of each provision in the original legislative
process and the quality of deliberation the provision has seen since enactment.395
D. Administrative Common Law’s Weakness
Just as Kryptonite weakens Superman,396 superstatute theory weakens
administrative common law. The flaw superstatute theory reveals in administrative
common law is not simply its derivation in countermajoritarian courts.397 Rather, the
problem is that the courts are not engaged in a deliberative feedback loop with an
agency that in turn parleys with the public and (unlike the other branches of
government) has an obligation to respond to the public’s views.398 This deliberation
deficiency makes it problematic to stretch the APA’s text too far, much less impose
doctrines of administrative common law that extend the law beyond the text’s
breaking point and conflict with Congress’s intent.399
As mentioned in Part I, although scholars have endorsed administrative common
law since the APA was enacted, Gillian Metzger has written its most comprehensive
and convincing defense.400 Metzger believes that little can be gained by resisting
administrative common law and that any debate about administrative common law
devolves to an inquiry about “whether a particular instance of judicial lawmaking
falls within the acceptable range.”401 To enable that inquiry, Metzger prescribes
increased judicial candor.402

395. Interpretation of the APA should be tailored to the unique circumstances of this
particular enactment. Cf. Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 42, at 797–800 (arguing that
the Court tailors statutory interpretation doctrine to different circumstances).
396. DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“Superman’s sole weakness is his vulnerability to several forms of Kryptonite, an element from
Superman’s home planet.”); cf. Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of
Indian Nations, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 55 (2002) (“The saddest thing of all is the number of Indian
academics who basically yearn for a time which never existed, when Indian sovereignty was
like Superman in a universe without kryptonite. That never even happened for Superman.
Somebody always had a little rock of kryptonite to whip out and Superman was toast.”).
397. See Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 600, 604.
398. See Metzger, supra note 24, at 530.
399. Cf. Strauss, supra note 245, at 1420 (interpretation of the APA must be constrained “by
the possibilities of [the] text”); see also Strauss, On Resegregating, supra note 384, at 440–41.
400. See supra text accompanying note 70.
401. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1348; see also id. at 1351, 1355. This point is well taken,
particularly since I have cabined my inquiry here to common law that contradicts or ignores
the APA.
402. Id. at 1370; accord Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 635–38 (prescribing judicial

2015]

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMON LAW

1255

In many ways, Metzger’s analysis is right on target. Administrative common law
may be important and unavoidable in some contexts, and the courts certainly should
be more transparent in their development of administrative common law. Applying
superstatute theory to the APA, however, reveals a principal weakness in
administrative common law: the absence of ongoing public deliberation about the
APA at the agency level renders administrative common law suspect and requires
the courts to pay closer attention to the APA itself and to the legislative process. Even
Metzger’s formidable defense cannot stand up to the deliberation deficiency
superstatute theory exposes in the APA.
For administrative common law to be legitimate, it must answer concerns related
to not only separation of powers and political accountability but also public
deliberation. The separation-of-powers objection to common law is familiar. The
Constitution separates Congress’s power to make laws from the courts’ power to
interpret laws in order to avoid tyranny and safeguard liberty.403 As Thomas Merrill
concluded, “[I]nstitutionalization of lawmaking by federal courts would represent a
major shift in policymaking power away from Congress and toward the federal
judiciary, in violation of the constitutional scheme.”404 I do not claim that all federal
common law raises separation-of-powers concerns, but administrative common law
that ignores or contradicts the APA certainly does.
Metzger argues that separation-of-powers concerns are not an “obstacle” to
administrative common law because administrative common law “can advance
separation of powers values” by structuring the relationships between the
branches.405 Certainly the courts may “preserve checks and balances and avoid a
single branch’s aggrandizement” on some occasions,406 but that does not solve the
fundamental problem of the courts believing that they have the power to decide
whether and when to do so.407 Metzger claims that Congress’s power to override
administrative common law decisions can prevent excessive judicial
aggrandizement, particularly if courts are more candid in developing administrative
common law.408 Even if congressional vetogates did not hinder the passage of
legislation,409 the possibility of a legislative override does not justify the courts

candor as a means of ending the common law practice of giving super deference to the military).
403. See Kovacs, Leveling, supra note 38, at 600–02; Merrill, supra note 29, at 19–20.
404. Merrill, supra note 29, at 23.
405. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1346–47; accord Bremer, supra note 16, at 1267–68
(arguing that administrative law’s “unwritten constitution” imposes limits on judicial
lawmaking and “provides a basis for evaluating the substantive validity of administrative
common law rules”); Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial
Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2242869 (arguing that
administrative common law can enable the courts to “strike the right balance of powers
between courts and agencies”).
406. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1346.
407. Cf. Bagley, supra note 48, at 1327 (“[T]he courts have no business contorting statutes
to accord with background values, however widely held courts believe those values to be.”).
408. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1347, 1356; see also Metzger, supra note 24, at 511; Gluck,
supra note 24, at 807.
409. See generally Eskridge, Vetogates, supra note 292; see also Bressman, supra note 63,
at 1773 (asserting that Congress’s ability to overrule common law standards of review is
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invading Congress’s lawmaking turf in the first place.410 Moreover, Metzger admits
that a lack of judicial candor makes it difficult for the political branches to respond
effectively to court decisions,411 and she doesn’t explain how more judicial candor
will solve that problem given that it is Congress’s inability to act which she contends
makes administrative common law inevitable.412
Even if traditional separation-of-powers concerns do not undermine
administrative common law’s legitimacy, there is the related but distinct problem of
its lack of political accountability.413 Thomas Merrill explained that federal common
law is constrained not just by federalism and separation of powers but also by “the
principle that public policy should be made by officials who are answerable to the
people through periodic elections.”414 The fact that federal judges are not elected
cannot bar judicial lawmaking, he posited, since the Constitution designed the federal
courts that way.415 Nonetheless, “[a]ny exercise of lawmaking by federal courts
represents a potential erosion of the principle of electoral accountability and hence
presents a problem of legitimacy.”416
Just as administrative common law can further separation-of-powers values,
Metzger argues, so too can it address the concern about political accountability “by
fostering effective congressional and presidential controls on administrative
action.”417 That the Court may choose to enhance the political accountability of
agencies in certain cases, however, does not make the Court itself politically
accountable when creating administrative common law.
Metzger makes a valid point in arguing that separation-of-powers and political
accountability objections to common law go too far. If those objections are sustained,
then all common law is constitutionally illegitimate, and such an absolute objection
to common law does not comport with current legal doctrine, which acknowledges

limited because such standards “are too amenable to case-by-case elaboration, rather than
legislative consensus”).
410. Merrill, supra note 29, at 22–23, 26. Abbe Gluck argues that conceptualizing statutory
interpretation principles as common law “would alleviate separation of powers concerns,”
because Congress can revise common law by statute. Gluck, supra note 24, at 807.
Administrative common law differs from statutory interpretation principles, however, insofar
as Congress has already enacted legislation; the courts’ persistent reliance on administrative
common law does not pay adequate respect to Congress’s efforts.
411. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1356–57.
412. Metzger’s contention that administrative common law gives the courts room to
address constitutional concerns about the Fourth Branch “without having to confront those
tensions head on,” see id. at 1321, 1339–41, is out of sync with her ultimate plea for more
transparency in the development of administrative common law, see id. at 1370.
413. See Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints:
Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617,
624–27 (2010).
414. Merrill, supra note 29, at 24.
415. Id. at 25.
416. Id. at 27. Traditionally, however, elections are considered the “primary control” on
government, and separation of powers is an “auxiliary precaution.” Nzelibe & Stephenson,
supra note 413, at 625 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999)).
417. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1347.
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that courts may sometimes “create law.”418 The Administrative Procedure Act is
distinguishable, however, because Congress and the President put so much effort into
shaping this law, both before and after its enactment. The Act’s history raises the
separation-of-powers stakes. Saying that the courts should respect that exceptional
legislative effort is not tantamount to saying that courts should never make law. Rather,
it simply urges that judicial review should be deliberation-respecting. In any event, I
do not take issue with administrative common law where Congress has carved out
space for it or employed terms so capacious as to invite it.419 Rather, my focus here is
on administrative common law that contravenes or ignores the APA, instances when
the courts have not exercised their usual caution in fashioning federal common law.
Moreover, superstatute theory reveals a third legitimacy problem with this kind
of administrative common law in addition to separation of powers and political
accountability: lack of public deliberation. Eskridge and Ferejohn explained that the
common-law approach to constitutional law has the benefit of allowing the
Constitution to be updated over time, but it is “unconnected to public feedback” and
thus “runs the risk of alienating fundamental law from popular sources of
legitimacy.”420 Similarly, administrative common law provides an efficient means of
updating the law, but it is virtually unmoored from public deliberation because there is
no agency that has the authority to issue binding interpretations of the APA and that
engages in an ongoing dialogue with both the courts and the public.421 Indeed, Metzger
recognizes that administrative common law is difficult “to square with the principle of
democratic government,” given that it is “shielded from public acknowledgment and
scrutiny.”422 This is administrative common law’s principal weakness.
Just as administrative common law may further separation-of-powers values and
foster political accountability, so too may it enhance public deliberation.423 The courts
developed common law governing rule-making procedures, for example, “to facilitate
meaningful public participation and transparency in rulemaking.”424 But the public
involvement that body of common law may facilitate typically concerns an agency’s
interpretation of a substantive statute, not the APA, and thus does not facilitate
civic-republican deliberation about the APA or the common law doctrines themselves.
Moreover, administrative common law can have unforeseen consequences.425 The

418. Id. at 1347–48. Whether current legal doctrine is flawed is beyond the scope of this Article.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
420. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 445.
421. Cf. Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 291 (arguing that
agency-based deliberation has the best potential for meeting the civic republican ideal).
422. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1356; see also Metzger, supra note 105, at 1928–29
(recognizing that courts are insulated from political and popular influence); Seidenfeld, Civic
Republican Justification, supra note 291, at 1543–44 (explaining why court deliberation does
not meet the civic-republican ideal).
423. See Bressman, supra note 63, at 1769–70, 1776–77, 1791 (arguing that the Court
develops some administrative law doctrines to enhance congressional oversight by giving
constituents access to information); Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative
Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 313, 316–17, 323, 325 (2013) (arguing that administrative law doctrines reinforce values
including deliberation, participation, and transparency).
424. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 520 (2013).
425. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 1328–36 (detailing the consequences of the common
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common law governing notice-and-comment rulemaking contributed to regulatory
ossification.426 Perhaps if those common law requirements had been subject to more
civic-republic deliberation, that result could have been avoided. As Nicholas Bagley
said in reference to the common law presumption of reviewability, Congress struck a
balance “between a host of incommensurate values. It is Congress’s role, not the
courts’, to strike that balance. . . . The courts have no constitutional authority to revise
that judgment and no epistemic basis for thinking they can make a better one.”427
Metzger argues that administrative common law is inevitable because Congress
cannot keep statutes up to date, much less constrain agencies effectively. That
disability requires the courts to step in to keep agencies in line.428 Yet, administrative
common law is not always inevitable, as evidenced by Vermont Yankee,429
Greenwich Collieries,430 Dickinson v. Zurko,431 and other cases in which the Supreme
Court adhered strictly to the text of the APA. Judicial review can respect the
deliberation that has occurred and instigate further deliberation. Wong Yang Sung432
is a prime example: within six months of the Supreme Court’s decision that the APA
applied to Immigration and Naturalization Service adjudications, Congress
overturned it.433 The APA saw significant deliberation pre-enactment, and it has seen
much deliberation since.434 In fact, the APA is currently the subject of heated debate
in Congress.435 To respect that deliberation and encourage further deliberation, the
courts should stay within the boundaries of the APA’s text and prod Congress to
answer the unanswered questions.436
One might object that Congress is too dysfunctional to be the focus of
deliberation. The 111th Congress, however, from January 2009 to January 2011, was
the most productive in decades.437 As Matthew Christiansen and William Eskridge

law presumption of reviewability).
426. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483–84
(1997) (“[D]evelopments in administrative law over the past two decades that were meant to
expand public participation and influence in administrative decisionmaking have
unintentionally” led to “ossification.”).
427. Bagley, supra note 48, at 1330; see also id. at 1322.
428. See Metzger, supra note 16, at 1322, 1329, 1331.
429. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
430. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries,
512 U.S. 267 (1994).
431. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
432. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
433. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955).
434. See supra Parts III.A, C.
435. See, e.g., Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2013, S. 15,
113th Cong. (2013).
436. Of course, Congress may debate and override administrative common law decisions,
but the possibility of after-the-fact legislative deliberation does not legitimize the courts’
disrespect for deliberation that came before. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 22, 26.
437. See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065,
2078, 2085 (2013); David A. Fahrenthold, Philip Rucker & Felicia Sonmez, Stormy 111th
Congress Was Still the Most Productive in Decades, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/22/AR2010122205620.html.
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found in their empirical study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory
interpretation decisions, “Congress is capable of policy responses even in periods of
divided government and partisan acrimony.”438 The APA itself has seen significant
legislative deliberation in recent years.439 So, Congress does still deliberate.
Nonetheless, even if Congress is dysfunctional, that does not justify abandoning the
constitutional design and allowing courts to enable that dysfunction.
Deliberation-respecting review of the APA would be the death knell of
administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the APA. For example, the
same arbitrary or capricious standard of review applies to all agencies, and the history
of the APA confirms that Congress intended for all agencies to be treated alike. The
courts’ practice of giving super deference to particular agencies, like the military,
exceeds the boundaries of the text and contradicts Congress’s intent, making it
illegitimate.440 The same can be said of prudential ripeness doctrine, which
contradicts the APA’s provision of a cause of action for any person with the requisite
harm who challenges “final agency action” by injecting considerations of judicial
competence.441 Many of the courts’ rulemaking requirements exceed the boundaries
of the APA’s text.442 In the pending case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,
the Supreme Court should reverse the D.C. Circuit’s holding that agencies must go
through notice and comment before significantly revising interpretive rules because
that holding directly contradicts the APA.443 Similarly, Judge Kavanaugh observed
that the Portland Cement doctrine, which requires agencies to disclose the studies
upon which they rely in rulemaking, “cannot be squared with the text of § 553.”444
Finally, in employing Chevron doctrine—aside from the efforts of individual justices
in dissents—the Court has largely ignored the APA. It is entirely possible that the
current view of Chevron can be harmonized with statutory text and history,445 but the
Court must do so if it is to pay adequate respect to civic-republican deliberation.

438. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 387, at 1460; see also id. at 1333, 1339.
Christiansen and Eskridge predicted that, in the long term, “pressures from interest groups,
agencies, and the states ought to press Congress to update aging superstatutes, with the result
being a resurgence of overrides.” Id. at 1353.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 252–258. Jody Freeman and David B. Spence
contend that Congress is unlikely to enact regulatory legislation and thus “the normative
commitment to democracy-forcing is based on a flawed empirical assumption about the
probability of congressional action.” Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New
Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2014). I am less concerned about Congress enacting
legislation, however, than I am about Congress deliberating. Moreover, Freeman and Spence’s
response to Congress’s dysfunction is to allow agencies to fill the policymaking gaps, not
courts. The APA does not provide that alternative.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42.
441. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 59–63.
443. See Mortgage Bankers Assoc. v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2820 (2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra
note 14 (manuscript at 24–29).
444. Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Portland Cement Ass’n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392–93 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
445. See supra text accompanying notes 54–57.
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In the end, Metzger may not disagree with my contention that these and other
doctrines of administrative common law should fall. She points out that “[s]ome
judicial moves may be deemed unsupportable because they simply conflict too much
with governing statutes.”446 But Metzger starts from the position that administrative
common law is important, inevitable, and legitimate.447 I start from the opposite
position—that administrative common law is suspect. Courts should respect the
civic-republican deliberation reflected in the APA’s text and in the pre- and
post-enactment legislative history and avoid shifting the balance Congress reached
through the political process.
CONCLUSION
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory of superstatutes makes an important contribution to
the law. Among many other things, it provides a lens through which we may examine
particular statutes. Viewing the APA through that lens reveals unexpected results.
Instead of supporting broad, evolutive interpretations of the APA, superstatute theory
advises closer adherence to the statute’s text and Congress’s expectations.
The APA is a quasi-constitutional, entrenched superstatute. Unlike a typical
superstatute, however, the APA is not administered by a single agency. Hence, the
APA is not subject to the sort of administrative deliberation upon which superstatute
theory depends to justify interpreting superstatutes evolutively. The public is not
included in any feedback loop with an agency, Congress, the President, and the courts
engaged in interpreting the APA.
Eskridge and Ferejohn did not discuss statutes like the APA that bear the
hallmarks of a superstatute but are not subject to an administrative feedback loop.
Nonetheless, their work points in a particular direction, albeit not the direction one
might anticipate. Rather than supporting evolutive interpretations of the APA,
superstatute theory’s focus on deliberation counsels hesitation before stretching the
terms of the statute. In the absence of an administering agency, Congress is the locus
of public deliberation about the APA. Thus, deliberation-focused review of the APA
centers on the deliberation in the legislative process before and after 1946 and
requires close attention to the compromises encoded in the Act. If that inquiry does
not answer a question that requires an answer, the courts should prod Congress to
deliberate further and provide an answer.
Administrative common law contradicts that deliberation-focused approach. In
other areas of the law, an agency links judicial consideration to the public, the
President, and Congress. But when courts impose rules of administrative law that
stretch the APA’s text beyond its breaking point, those rules are unmoored from any
public deliberation and therefore cannot be considered legitimate.

446. Metzger, supra note 16, at 1353.
447. Id. at 1296–97.

